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Abstract
With increasing energy demand and an intermittent supply of renewable energy sources, our
current energy grid needs a transformation towards a more robust, reliable energy trading architecture. The smart grid promises this architecture as the future of the present energy market,
where traders will use digital technologies to automate the management of power delivery. It will
improve many issues of the current energy grid such as sustainable, clean, renewable, reliable and
secure energy supply, customer participation in markets, distributed generation, and transparency
in energy trading. Using autonomous trading agents, we can bridge several dynamic energy
markets and ensure an efficient and robust trading environment for all the players in the smart
grid. The Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) simulation emphasizes the strategic
problems that autonomous trading agents, i.e., brokers, will face in managing the economics of a
smart grid.
In Power TAC, brokers make trades in multiple parallel markets such as wholesale, tariff, and
balancing markets to supply energy from producers to consumers. To be successful, brokers must
make reasonable predictions about future supply, demand, and prices in the wholesale and tariff
markets to make trading decisions by maintaining a favorable energy imbalance in the balancing
market.
Market clearing price prediction is an integral part of the broker’s wholesale market strategy
because it helps the broker to make intelligent decisions for purchasing energy at low cost in a
day-ahead wholesale market. People use machine learning methods to predict prices in the Power
TAC wholesale Periodic Double Auction (PDA) market, where the brokers can take advantage of
the price predictor to design bidding strategies. PDAs are commonly used in real-world energy
markets to trade energy in specific time slots to balance demand on the power grid where multiple
discrete trading periods are specified for a single type of good. Strategically, bidding in a PDA is
complicated because the bidder must predict and plan for future auctions that may influence the
bidding strategy for the current auction.

vi

In our work, we use the RepTree model to predict prices and present a general bidding strategy for PDAs. Our wholesale market strategy uses forecasted clearing prices and Monte Carlo
Tree Search (MCTS) to plan a bidding approach across multiple time-periods. Additionally, we
present a fast heuristic policy that can be used either as a standalone method or as a seeding
technique to initialize the search space of the MCTS bidding strategy. We evaluate our bidding
strategies using a controlled PDA simulator based on the wholesale market implemented in the
PowerTAC competition. We demonstrate that our strategies outperform state-of-the-art champion
bidding strategies designed for that competition.
In the retail market, a broker makes sequential decisions simultaneously with other brokers
to buy and sell energy through publishing tariffs where a tariff is a contract between a broker and
a customer. To be as profitable as possible, a broker needs an effective energy selling retail strategy. Our work includes developing an isolated miniature retail market simulator to control the
dynamic and stochastic variables of the vibrant, complex retail market so that we can understand
the basic features and strategic dynamics among retail trading strategies. We apply deep reinforcement learning (DQN) to learn the best response (BR) strategy for a specific strategy played
in this simulator. Using DQN as a best response learning technique, we propose “Clustered Double Oracle Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis”(CDO-EGTA), a novel method for minimizing
regret (i.e., maximizing revenues) in retail trading. CDO-EGTA method clusters the existing pool
of strategies into some groups, learns a new BR strategy for each of the groups using the Double
Oracle Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis method, and outputs a class of BR strategies to play
the game. Empirical results show that our method outperforms the existing methods in regret
comparison.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the increasing electricity demand and intermittent supply of renewable energy sources in
the twenty-first century, our current energy grid infrastructure is facing numerous difficult challenges and needs a transformation. It lacks several critical features such as sustainable energy
consumption, trading transparency, effective use of pricing and demand response of energy, customer participation, enhanced reliability, and proper distribution management for variable-output
renewable energy sources [32]. The Smart Grid is a modern electricity market that promises
to provide a more intelligent energy infrastructure [30] than the current traditional energy grid
by incorporating more advanced sensing capabilities and artificial intelligence for better decision making in energy trading. It can improve many problems caused by increasing energy
demand and intermittent renewable energy supply, where our current energy grid infrastructure
is more prone to fail. An advanced feature of this future energy grid is replacing humans with autonomous agents capable of making decisions in homes, businesses, and production facilities to
control power delivery, consumption, and trading. To achieve this vision and as the grid becomes
more decentralized, automated, and capable of providing much higher volumes of sensor data;
we need to develop the economic structures and decision-making algorithms to ensure reliable
and efficient energy delivery.
To this end, a key area of research for Smart Grids is to understand the market mechanisms
that can coordinate buying and selling decisions in energy markets, and develop automated trading agents that can represent individual people in these markets. One of the significant academic
efforts to develop such strategies centers on the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC),
a competition with over a decade of history [79]. The Power TAC scenario was designed to
represent the types of market structures and automated trading problems that would arise in fu-
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ture smart grids, focusing on capturing the features of real-world energy markets and emerging
smart grid technologies. It implements a sophisticated simulation environment that allows for
autonomous trading agents called brokers to compete to maximize their profits by participating
in a series of realistic energy markets. It is a trading agent competition [79] designed to advance
the understanding of market mechanisms that can coordinate buying and selling decisions in energy markets, and develop strategies for automated trading agents. Power TAC also supports
a competitive benchmarking [33] research model building on the experience of competitions in
2012-2017, such as where earlier successful competitions are the Trading Agent Competition
for Supply-Chain Management (TAC SCM) [13] and the Trading Agent Competition for Ad
Auctions (TAC AA) [27].
Power TAC is a rich energy market simulation consisting of several markets such as the
wholesale market, the tariff market, and the load balancing market to trade energy between producers and consumers. The broker operates in parallel in these markets and helps to bridge them
successfully [29]. Brokers trade energy from producers to consumers by doing competitive bidding in the wholesale market and publishing tariffs in the retail market.
The wholesale market is one of the primary markets in the Power TAC scenario, which is
based directly on similar real-world market designs. This market can be implemented using Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs), where a series of double auctions are held for producers and
brokers to trade energy for an upcoming period to balance the supply and demand in their energy
portfolios. While PDAs can be used to trade any type of good, one prominent use of this style of
auction is in short-term energy markets used to balance demand on the power grid (e.g., NordPool, FERC, or EEX [52, 14, 16]). The wholesale market is called a “day ahead” market in which
energy trading occurs up to one day in advance by an hourly basis of production/consumption.
The energy is a perishable good, and the wholesale market allows brokers to buy and sell quantities of energy for future delivery. Auction market structures like this exist across many different
types of perishable goods. So, finding useful, robust, automated strategies for these markets is a
significant research challenge.
The retail market is the other primary market where brokers compete mainly to sell energy
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to maximize their revenues. The customers in the retail market are households, offices, electric
vehicles, and some distributed prosumers. The customers trade energy through a broker where
the broker represents their energy demand in the wholesale market as his demand. Brokers buy
and sell energy by publishing tariffs in the retail market; thus, it is often called the tariff market.
A tariff is a contract between the broker and the customer to trade energy. The primary goal
of the broker in this market is to earn revenue by offering competitive tariffs. A broker should
publish profitable but attractive tariffs to get consumers/prosumers by maintaining a favorable
energy imbalance.

1.1

Main Challenges and Research Questions

In smart grids, an autonomous broker makes decisions continuously from a massive strategy,
state, and action space under real-time constraints while processing dynamic and stochastic information. It faces a strategic multi-agent environment in multiple parallel markets. A broker’s
main task is subsequent decision making in these markets to maximize profit throughout its continuance. While making these decisions, the main challenges brokers face include:
• Continuous high dimensional action space: To make bids in the wholesale or retail dynamic markets, brokers need to select a price from a high dimensional continuous price
space. Strategically selecting a near-optimal price is challenging as it depends on many
dynamic market factors.
• Time constrained sequential and simultaneous decisions: A broker selects a price in a
fixed limited time, and it makes these decisions simultaneously with other rival brokers in
sequential timeslots.
• Competitive multi-agent environment: N number of brokers can compete with each
other in these dynamic markets, where we see a duopoly environment when N = 2 and
oligopoly market when N > 2
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• High dimensional strategy space: The continuous action space and time-constrained sequential simultaneous decision making create a high dimensional strategy space for a broker. To compete in different types of market environments, a broker needs to select different
types of strategies to maximize its revenue or minimize its cost.
• High dimensional state space: Different types of brokers, strategies, actions, and dynamic variables create a high dimensional state space because we need a large feature set
to represent a state.
The competitiveness in the smart grid markets depends on the number of participant brokers and
their performances where a single broker’s performance propagates from one market to other
markets for a particular timeslot. By performance propagation in markets, we mean a broker’s
dependency on the wholesale market in the retail market. For example, one can not publish
attractive tariffs, i.e., cheaper price tariffs in the tariff market, if he is unable to buy it at a lower
price in the wholesale market.
On a first impression, it seems like finding optimal strategies for the broker is an impossible
task. As the task is quite complex, my primary objective in this dissertation is to “Develop
effective autonomous trading strategies” and investigate them empirically to achieve nearoptimal performance for dynamic energy markets.
I have selected the main two markets of the smart grid as a research test-bed.
1. Wholesale Market The brokers can procure energy from producers and other brokers
through the PDA wholesale market to satisfy their subscribed customers’ demand. A broker’s main objective in this market is to acquire the energy to meet demand at the lowest
possible cost. For this, we need to predict the prices in future auction markets and build a
bidding policy around those forecasted prices to minimize the cost. My primary research
question for this domain is “Can we design Monte Carlo Tree Search as a bidding strategy
to traverse and select cost-effective prices in periodic double auctions?” To answer this
question, we address the following subquestions:
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(a) What are the useful features and methods needed to predict market-clearing prices in
a periodic double auction?
(b) Can we effectively initialize a reduced bid price search space?
(c) Can Monte Carlo Tree Search iteratively expand the reduced search space with new
promising prices to find the cost-effective bid price?
(d) Will MCTS bidding strategy perform better than other PDA strategies in empirical
evaluation?
2. Retail Market The broker can earn a substantial amount of revenues from customers by
trading in the retail market through tariffs. A broker’s objective in this market is to trade
energy to achieve the highest possible revenue. There are many fees associated with energy
trading in markets such as capacitance fees and balancing fees. In the retail market, the
capacitance fee is imposed on the broker as a penalty to trade energy in the peak hours.
The balancing fee is imposed by the balancing market to penalize or incentivize the broker
based on their energy imbalances. A customer has some inertia to evaluate a tariff from the
market, and when it evaluates tariffs, it does not always make rational decisions. Brokers
can take advantage of these properties of customers and design retail strategies to maximize
their revenue. They should also make strategies to lessen those several fees with their tariffs
as much as possible. As the market is full of stochastic and dynamic behaviors, our primary
research approach is to recognize the core features of trading with customers and other
agents in this market by designing an isolated retail environment. Also, by doing empirical
analysis of strategies, we want to find a successful retail strategy. Our research question for
this domain is “Can we harness the strategic dynamics of existing retail trading policies to
develop a method to find a regret minimizing retail strategy?” To answer this question, we
can ask the following sub-questions:
(a) Can we formulate retail market trading as a game using game-theoretic concepts?
(b) Can we create an isolated small retail simulator to extract the strategic behaviors
among retail strategies by playing this game?
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(c) What features and game-theoretic solution concepts are needed to explore and select
profit-maximizing retail strategies in the isolated simulator?
(d) Will our method perform better than existing literature methods in the empirical analysis?
With these two separate strategies, one to minimize cost at the wholesale market and the other to
maximize revenue at the retail market, a broker is expected to be successful in maximizing profit
in the smart grid energy trading.

1.2

Contributions

My main contributions in answering these research questions are as follows:
1. Develop a novel wholesale bidding strategy using Monte Carlo Tree Search for periodic
double auctions to trade energy, focusing on minimizing cost.
(a) Learn features and evaluate different types of price predictors to precisely predict
PDA market-clearing prices.
(b) Develop a controlled PDA simulator to test PDA bidding strategies to reduce randomness and high dimensions.
(c) Design fast heuristic standalone PDA bidding strategies, which can also be used to
initiate a reduced and effective action space for MCTS bidding strategy.
(d) Adapt Monte Carlo Tree Search to simulate hour-ahead auctions and traverse through
bid prices to find cost-effective bids.
(e) Empirically evaluate the performance of the designed PDA bidding strategies.
2. Develop a method to find a retail strategy that can exploit the opponent’s strategy while
trading energy in the retail market to maximize revenue.
(a) Formalize the retail trading problem as a new game using game theory.
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(b) Develop an isolated retail simulator to extract the core dynamics of retail trading by
simplifying the Power TAC retail market and creating empirical meta-games.
(c) Propose a novel CDO-EGTA method that learns a class of new strategies to minimize
regret from an existing candidate pool of strategies.
(d) Use empirical game-theoretic regret analysis to evaluate the CDO-EGTA method,
where our method outperforms other literature methods.
(e) Have shown ways to improve the performance of the CDO-EGTA method.

1.3

Dissertation Overview

The rest of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the autonomous trading
problems, i.e., the primary domain of the dissertation and surveys related work. In Chapter 3, we
show work on the wholesale market price prediction. Chapter 4 explains the Monte Carlo Tree
Search wholesale bidding strategy using price predictors. Chapter 5 shows the results of learning
retail strategies in the dynamic Power TAC retail markets. Chapter 6 presents a novel method
for exploring and selecting better retail strategies from a strategy set of retail policies. Finally,
Chapter 7 present the conclusion and future work.
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Chapter 2
Background: Autonomous Trading
This chapter describes the main domain, the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC)
simulation environment. It focuses on the essential part of the simulator, which will help to
understand the rest of the dissertation. Section 2.1 overviews the competition and simulation
environment. Section 2.2 describes the main trading problems of the broker agent. Section 2.3
lists Power TAC’s modeling assumptions. Section 2.4 overviews the related work on this domain.

2.1

Power

Trading

Agent

Competition

(Power

TAC)

Overview
The Power TAC [31] models a competitive power market where broker agents buy and sell energy and maintain a portfolio of customers who both consume and supply energy. The brokers
compete to maximize their profits over approximately 60 simulated days. Each simulation begins
with 14 days of pre-game data (bootstrap data), which includes data on customers, the wholesale
market, and weather data based on the default broker. The brokers participate in three markets:
wholesale, tariff, and balancing market, where the simulation models a regulated distribution utility and a real location-based population of energy customers. Customer models include several
entities, such as households, electric vehicles, and various commercial and industrial models. In
the simulation, brokers try to make a profit by balancing the energy supply and demand as accurately as possible. By efficiently managing stochastic customer behaviors, weather-dependent
renewable energy sources, the broker with the highest bank balance wins the competition. We
refer the reader to the Power TAC game specification [31] for more detail. Fig. 2.1 illustrates
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Figure 2.1: Major elements of the Power TAC scenario.
major elements of Power TAC.

2.2

Broker’s Power Trading Problem

There are three main markets (Wholesale, Retail, and Balancing) in this simulation, which brings
three types of trading problems. The balancing market’s goal is to incentivize brokers if they can
balance the supply and demand as closely as possible. So the best thing is to avoid participating
in the balancing market for now. In this dissertation, we mainly focus on the other two important
markets. Fig. 2.2 illustrates a broker’s one timeslot activities.

2.2.1

Wholesale Market Trading

In a double auction, both buyers and sellers may place bids. An auction is periodic if market
clearing is triggered based on a specific time interval, so all bids that arrive at an interval are
considered in a batch clearing process. A PDA clears bids by matching buy (bid) and sell (ask)
9

Figure 2.2: Broker’s one timeslot activities.
orders and determining the clearing price for each auction [83]. If the minimum ask price has
a higher value than the maximum bid price, then the market does not clear. The Power TAC
wholesale market functions as a short-term spot market for buying and selling energy commitments in specific time slots, where each time slot represents a simulated hour. Agents can always
participate in 24 auctions to trade energy, one auction for each of the next 24 hours. These auctions are Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs), similar to those used in European or North American
wholesale energy markets [31]. Brokers can submit bids (orders to buy energy) and asks (orders
to sell energy), represented by a quantity and an optional limit price. In addition to the brokers’
bids, several large “Gencos” also sell energy on the wholesale market. In a double auction, both
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Figure 2.3: Market clearing example: bid 6 and part of ask five are the last to clear.
buyers and sellers may place bids. An auction is periodic if market clearing is triggered based on
a specific time interval, so all bids that arrive at an interval are considered in a batch clearing process. A PDA clears bids by matching buy (bid) and sell (ask) orders and determining the clearing
price for each auction [83]. If the minimum ask price has a higher value than the maximum bid
price, then the market does not clear. Fig. 4.4 illustrates an example of an hour ahead auction
market clearing. So the wholesale market’s primary challenge is to bid at the right price at the
right time to purchase energy at the lowest possible price.

2.2.2

Retail Market Trading

In the retail market, the broker trade the energy by publishing tariffs for consumers and distributed
renewable energy producers. In Power TAC, it is also called Tariff Market. A tariff can include:
1. Prices which can be flat rate or variable by time or usage
2. Periodic payments
3. Early withdrawal penalties
11

4. Subscription bonus
Brokers can publish one or more tariffs once every 6 hours, and once a tariff is published, customers can subscribe to it as long as the tariff is active (i.e., not revoked).

Figure 2.4: Tariff selection problem.
Customers will stochastically subscribe to the attractive, active tariffs in the tariff market.
Attractive tariffs are those tariffs where the customer will be able to minimize their cost and
discomfort. A discomfort is created when the customer has to shift/curtail their loads to other
timeslots. A customer is incorporated with smart meters, which send information to the broker
every hour about its consumption and production. Some customers represent a bulk of individuals (e.g., a village of 30,000 people). The whole population does not need to subscribe to a tariff.
Different subsets of the same population can subscribe to different brokers’ tariffs, but one individual cannot subscribe to the same type of tariffs of multiple brokers. The same type of tariff
and individual population have one to one relation. A customer might not do tariff evaluation
regularly because of its inertia property. When it evaluates tariffs in the retail market, it might not
always make the rational choice. The primary challenge in the retail market is to publish effective
tariffs to maximize profit.
12

2.3

Power TAC Assumptions

The Power TAC Simulator [31] makes these following assumptions:
1. Line capacity limitations are assumed to be non-existent for now but will have to be
rethought in the future once more distributed generators and storage facilities are simulated.
2. Power factor effects are ignored for now. A lower power factor means in higher energy
losses, and these would possibly affect brokers’ decision making on how to charge customers and producers, which is out of scope for now.
3. Power distribution and transformation losses are ignored. These losses are estimated to be
5.5% in North America [25], which we can treat as a constant. Therefore the correctness
of the simulation results is not affected by this assumption.
4. In addition to traditional energy generation companies, two more types of producers are
simulated. The first type of producer produces energy when they are active and under control of the owners, such as solar panels and wind turbines. The second type of producer
is PEV batteries and some CHP units. These are “controllable,” i.e., the output can be
controlled remotely. Such examples are electric vehicle batteries. These two types of producers are becoming more and more popular in the real world and, therefore, are simulated
in the simulation.
5. Real-time technical load balancing operations are out of the broker’s action space and are
accomplished by using a combination of controllable generators and spinning reserves.
6. The simulation models time as a series of discrete “timeslots” each representing one hour.
The regional wholesale market trading intervals are model using this, and this assumption
allows the simulator to simulate days rather than minutes or hours.
7. The imbalance between demand and supply for a timeslot is calculated as the difference
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of the sum of generation and sum of consumption for that specific timeslot rather than the
immediate difference between the two-time series.
8. Using prospective or real-time price signals, some portion of the load can be controlled.

2.4

Related Work

Previous agents in both Power TAC and earlier TAC competitions have considered similar trading
problems. In TAC Travel Competitions, boosting-based algorithms have been used to predict
hotel prices [81, 22]. Boosting algorithms take weak learning algorithms like regression and
boost their performance by training more classifiers and combine them. One agent took advantage
of using neural networks for which were trained for each hotel to predict prices [81, 22].
AstonTAC is a Power TAC agent that uses a Non-Homogeneous Hidden Markov Model
(NHHMM) to forecast energy demand and price [39]. This was the only agent in that competition
that was able to buy energy at a low price in the wholesale market and keep energy imbalance low.
TacTex13, the winner of the 2013 Power TAC competition, uses a modified version of Tesauro’s
bidding algorithm. They modeled the subsequent bidding process as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) for the wholesale market [70]. The wholesale trading module of AgentUDE [48] (the
2014 Power TAC champion) uses an adaptive Q-learning bidding strategy that tracks the past
market data. The broker using this technique can understand the market trends regardless of
weather conditions and time. In the TAC/SCM game, Deep Maize used a Bayesian model of the
stochastic demand process to estimate the underlying demand and trend. It employs a k-NearestNeighbors technique to predict the useful demand curves from historical data, self-play games
data, and the current game data [35]. TacTex [71], the 2013 and 2015 Power TAC winner, uses a
modified version of Tesauro’s bidding algorithm, which models the subsequent bidding process
as a Markov Decision Process for the wholesale market which is considered to be the current
state-of-the-art bidding strategy in PDAs. While there are many other bidding strategies for double auctions [19], most of them are for Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs) [64] and would need
to be modified for PDAs.
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In the tariff strategy, TacTex uses LATTE (Lookahead-policy for Autonomous Timeconstrained Trading of Electricity) algorithm [69] to bid in the wholesale market and to publish
tariffs in the retail market. It is a general algorithm that can be instantiated in different ways under
a variety of environmental conditions. TacTex tries to estimate the long-term utilities of candidates’ actions and, in turn, reduces the complexity of searching in a high dimensional searching
space by using its look ahead policy. They also did an empirical analysis of the impact of TimeOf-Use (TOU) tariffs in the competitive electric markets as they are proposed for demand-side
management both in the literature and the real world. TugaTAC agent [55] uses a fuzzy logic
algorithm based on the customer portfolio, where it allows the agent to do adaptive configuration
given a complex parameter set in the environment. AgentUDE17 uses an online genetic algorithm to find the best prices for tariffs [49]. This agent is the champion agent in 2017 and 2018.
It optimizes the parameters of an electricity consumption tariff, such as unit retail price, periodic
payments, signup bonuses, and early withdrawal penalty payments on the fly. Moreover, it also
uses a time-of-use (TOU) tariff to reduce the peak demand charges. The authors aim to find a
point near the global optimum using a genetic algorithm where the other agents’ algorithms fail to
explore the full search space because they focus on a small portion of the retail trading problem.
In recent times, deep learning has been successfully worked in learning superhuman strategies
for extensive-form games like Go, chess, and shogi [59], [60]. It uses a neural net as a function
approximator to generalize the experience, which is more robust than tabular q-learning methods
as it can deal with high dimensional state space. A (Deep Neural Net) DNN and associated
learning algorithm for deep RL known as a deep Q-network (DQN) [45] has been demonstrated
to learn strong policies for playing Atari games using only pixel input, based on the Q-learning
method [76] of Watkins and Dayan. Deep reinforcement learning has also been successfully
applied to other problems with imperfect information, multiple players with asymmetric roles,
and non-zero-sum payoffs from cooperative-competitive games [61] to video games like Super
Smash Bros. [17], Dota 2 [47], and Doom [40].
Using specialized algorithms as oracles, McMahan et al. [43] introduced the double-oracle
algorithm and applied it to a robot path-planning game. Using a mixed-integer linear program
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(MILP) to compute best responses, Jain et al. [26] developed a well-known application of doubleoracle for attacker and defender agents in a checkpoint-placement security game. When someone
does not have an explicit game model, he/she can develop a simulator and learn best responses
through RL. People call it empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) [77] when they solve game
models from simulations. Schvartzman and Wellman [57] connected RL with EGTA, applying
tabular Q-learning with tile coding to learn better strategies in a continuous double auction trading
game. Mason et al. also use Q-learning in a similar work without DNNs [82]. Recently, Wang
et al. [75] presented work on applying DQN as the oracle for a zero-sum security game. History
Aware Double Oracle EGTA (HADO-EGTA) proposes a modification of DO-EGTA where the
author keeps track of previous equilibrium strategies and learn a new DQN strategy over the
mix-strategies of current and previous equilibriums [80].

2.5

Chapter Summary

The Power TAC simulator is reasonably rich and realistic and can be viewed as a reasonable
substrate domain for studying future power market conditions. Future energy grid will require
new market structures [23]. As implementing new power market structures at a large scale in the
real world is risky [3], we need to simulate these potential markets first using realistic simulators.
Hence Power TAC simulator plays an essential role as a low-risk testbed to test and study general
market conditions and agent strategies from the economic point of view.
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Chapter 3
Learning Prices in Dynamic Wholesale
Market
The main problem we consider in this chapter is learning to predict the clearing prices of periodic
double auctions, which can be used by the agent to implement an effective bidding strategy.
Our baseline broker used a moving average price prediction based on the price history of the
agent. To predict a new price for a week-ahead specific hour price, the baseline agent uses
a weighted sum of the current hour’s clearing price; yesterday’s predicted clearing price for
that specific hour and 6 days ahead same hour predicted price. We have experimented with
three different machine learning methods to predict clearing prices in the wholesale market: (i)
REPTree (a type of decision tree) [15], (ii) Linear Regression, and (iii) Multilayer Perceptron (a
type of neural network). We have also investigated a variety of different features for training the
predictors. These include eight price features that capture information about the recent trading
history, such as the clearing price for the previous hour and the prices for the equivalent time
slot in the previous day and week. We also include the weather forecast and time of day because
the energy production of renewable energy producers (e.g., solar) depends on these factors. The
number of participants in the game is included because the amount of competition affects the
market-clearing price. Finally, we include a moving average of the prices as a convenient way to
capture an aggregate price history.
To generate training data, we use simulations with a variety of agent binaries from previous
tournaments, as well as a variety of different bootstrap initialization files. We train our models
using Weka [24] and evaluate their ability to predict market-clearing prices based on the mean
absolute prediction error only for auctions that clear (we do not include auctions that do not clear
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in the error calculations). In the following experiments, we investigate the performance of the
models in several areas, including how well they generalize to new agents, different numbers of
agents, and how important the different features are to the performance of the predictors.

3.1

Supervised Price Predictors

We begin with an essential evaluation of the prediction accuracy of the learned models. One of
the most significant factors we discovered that influences the accuracy of the models is how we
handle auctions that do not clear. In many cases, an auction will have no clearing price due to a
spread between the bid and ask prices, which results in the simulation returning null values for
these prices. This causes significant problems with the price features we use, as well as the final
error calculations. To improve this, we calculate an estimated clearing price for auctions that do
not clear by taking the average of the lowest ask price and the highest bid price. Figure 3.1 shows

Figure 3.1: Effect of Clearing Price Estimation
the prediction errors during a single simulation for two different REPTree models trained on 20
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games, one with estimated clearing prices and the other without. We also include the errors for a
simple moving average price predictor as a baseline for comparison. Each data point shows the
average error for all auctions in a window of five timeslots. The data show that both REPTree
models outperform the moving average predictor. However, the version with estimated clearing
prices is dramatically better and produces much more consistent predictions throughout the entire
game.
Next, we compare the performance of the three different learning methods with different
amounts of training data ranging from 5 to 20 games. We evaluated a variety of different configurations of hidden layers for the Multilayer Perceptron model; only the best one is shown
here (MP-20-20, i.e., 2 layers neural network with 20 nodes in each layer). Figure 3.2 shows

Figure 3.2: Comparison of Several Prediction Models by Number of Games
the average mean absolute error for the different models based on five games of test data. The
results show that the decision tree model makes good predictions compared to other models. The
decision tree model slowly improves according to the number of games, while other models do
not show this trend. The default Multilayer Perceptron (1 layer with 18 nodes) with estimated
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prices shows some improvement in the initial number of games than REPTree but finally loses to
REPTree in the 20 game model. In all cases, the models with estimated clearing prices are much
better than models without estimated prices.

3.2
3.2.1

Evaluation of Price Predictors
Predictor Against Different Types of Agents

In the Power TAC competition, broker agents play many games against different opponents with
varying strategies. Here, we test how well our predictors generalize to playing new agents that
are not in the training data. We test our models on games of the same size, but varying one of the
agents in the game between AgentUDE15, cwiBroker15, and TacTex14. All the predictor models
are generated from the training dataset where AgentUDE is used. Figure 3.3 shows the average

Figure 3.3: Comparison of Several Prediction Models
results for each of the learning methods in the three different agent environments. The REPTree
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predictor consistently does better than others, though differences are depending on the pool of
opponents. We can also see that the models do best against AgentUDE (which was in the training
set), and there is a significant decrease in accuracy when playing either cwiBroker or TacTex.

3.2.2

Predictor Against Different Number of Agents

In the competition or real world, broker agents must play in games with varying numbers of
opponents. We experiment with different number of brokers in the games, ranging from 3 to
7 brokers. We focus here on the REPTree predictor since it performs better than the others
consistently in previous experiments. The 5 agent predictor models trained on data generated
from SPOT(Baseline), AgentUDE15, cwiBroker15, SampleBroker, Maxon14 and the 7 agent
predictor models use data from SPOT(Baseline), AgentUDE15, cwiBroker15, SampleBroker,
Maxon14, Maxon15, COLDPower and CrocodileAgent15. The test data uses the same agents.
We also trained a predictor based on a mixed dataset that included the same number of training
games, but with a combination of 3, 5, and 7 agent games. The data in Figure 3.4 shows that, in
each case, the model trained on the correct number of agents has the best performance. However,
we also note that the mixed model performs very well in all three cases. Table 3.1 shows the
average error of the predictor models over the 3 different test game data, and demonstrates that
the average error for the mixed model is better than any of the other three models.
Table 3.1: Average Error for the Various Agent Models

3.3

7 Agent

5 Agent

3 Agent

Mixed Agent

13.406

13.714

13.958

13.225

Feature Evaluation

To evaluate which features are the most important for the predictions we used ReliefFAttributeEvaluation [54] and the Ranker method in Weka to rank our 18 features. We also used the
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Figure 3.4: Comparison for Different Number of Agents
ClassifierSubsetEval method and best-first search to get the best subset of features from all the
features. Table 3.2 shows the top 7 features using the ranker algorithm and the best subset of
features using the ClassifierSubsetEval method. We ran the subset evaluation on 5, 10, 15, and
Table 3.2: Feature Evaluation
Ranked Features
Subset Evaluation
PreviousHourN 1Price

YesterdayClrPrice

PrevHourClrPrice

PreviousHourN 1Price

PredictedClrPrice

PredictedClrPrice

YesterdayClrPrice

PrevHourClrPrice

AWeekAgoN 1Price

Day

YesterdayN 1Price

HourAhead

PrevOneWeekClrPrice

CloudCoverage
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20 games and, for all cases, we found a consistent subset of seven features. The features such as
temperature, day of a month, month of a year, the number of participants are ranked low and also
out of the best subset. We could potentially discard these types of features while training a predictor model. From the ranked feature column, we see that price features are significant for the
REPTree predictor model. So, adding additional features of this type may improve performance.
We use two basic price prediction methods. While these could likely be improved with more
sophisticated machine learning methods, the main focus of our work is on the bidding policies,
and it would be trivial to adopt better price predictions in any of the policies we propose.

3.4

MDP Price Predictor

We also implement a price predictor used by one of the best agents from previous Power TAC
competitions, TacTex [70]. TacTex uses a MDP price predictor where the MDP is defined as
follows:
• State: s ∈ {0, 1, ..., 24, success}, s0 := 24.
• Action: limit price ∈ R.
• Transition: A state transitions to one of two states. If a bid is partially or fully cleared, it
transitions to the terminal success state. Otherwise, a state s transitions to state s − 1.
• Reward: In state s = 0, the reward is the balancing price per energy unit. In states
s ∈ 1, . . . , 24, it is 0. In state success, the reward is the limit price of the successful bid.
Both balancing price and limit price are taken as negative, so maximizing the reward results in
minimizing costs.
• Terminal State: : {0, success}
Since the MDP is acyclic, solving it requires one back-sweep, starting from state 0 to state 24.
The value function is defined as follows [70]:



balancing price if s = 0


V (s) =
minlimit price {pcleared ∗ limit price+



 (1 − p
) ∗ V (s − 1)} if 1 ≤ s ≤ 24
cleared
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The transition probability pcleared (s, limit price) for a limit price is computed as follows:
P

tr∈trades[s].tr.clearing price<limit price

P

tr∈trades[s]

tr.cleared energy amount

tr.cleared energy amount

Using this MDP’s solution, TacTex determines an optimal limit price for each of the 24 states.
We compare the accuracy of this online price predictor against the REPTree predictor with a
variation of sophisticated bidding strategies where we find that REPTree can predict better prices
than online MDP price predictor. A more detailed description is explained in the experiments
section 4.8.

3.5

Using Price Predictors for Bidding

We took the best performing predictor from our experiments (REPTree) and tested whether using
these predictions could improve performance for a basic bidding strategy. This strategy attempts
to target auctions where the clearing price is predicted to be low and to buy a higher volume of
the needed energy in those specific auctions. Figure 3.5 shows that using the new predictions and
bidding strategy, the agent can buy a high volume of the needed energy when the average clearing
price is lowest against the champion agent Maxon15.

3.6

Chapter Summary

It will be a significant advance if intelligent bidding agents can replace humans in wholesale
energy markets. We have shown as a first step that we can successfully use machine learning
to predict market prices in these auctions in a realistic, smart grid simulation. These predictions
are much more accurate than baselines that use moving averages to predict prices, and the error
amount is small enough that these should be useful in more sophisticated bidding strategies. The
next chapter focuses on designing and evaluating new bidding strategies for these auctions to
make use of the price prediction methods described here.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison for Wholesale Bidding Strategies
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Chapter 4
Wholesale Bidding Strategies
4.1

Introduction

Double auctions are ubiquitous, serving as a general method for buyers and sellers to exchange
goods at prices determined by market interactions. Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are a specific type of double auction in which bids are cleared periodically in a sequence of pre-defined
time periods, as opposed to immediately upon arrival as in a continuous auction. While PDAs
can be used to trade any type of good, one prominent use of this style of auction is in shortterm energy markets used to balance demand on the power grid (e.g., NordPool, FERC, or EEX
[52, 14, 16]). In this chapter, we present general methods for bidding in PDAs that could be applied to any type of market with this structure, but focus our evaluation on energy markets due to
the availability of a very realistic simulator and competitive bidding strategies designed by other
researchers for this domain. The specific contributions of this chapter are as follows: (1) We develop a controlled simulation environment to test PDA bidding strategies for realistic wholesale
energy markets. (2) We present two fast heuristic bidding policies based on machine learning
prediction methods for forecasting market-clearing prices. (3) We propose a dynamic MCTS
bidding strategy that performs a more comprehensive search of the policy space using an anytime
algorithm. (4) We perform empirical evaluations of our PDA bidding strategies using the principles of the Power TAC wholesale market as a platform and show that we significantly improve
over both baseline and state-of-the-art bidding strategies from the Power TAC competition.
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4.2
4.2.1

Background
Periodic Double Auctions (PDA)

In a double auction, both buyers and sellers may place bids. An auction is periodic if market
clearing is triggered based on a specific time interval, so all bids that arrive at an interval are
considered in a batch clearing process. A PDA clears bids by matching buy (bid) and sell (ask)
orders and determining the clearing price for each auction [83]. If the minimum ask price has a
higher value than the maximum bid price, then the market does not clear. Fig. 4.1 illustrates an

Figure 4.1: A three hour ahead Periodic Double Auction market example
example of a three hour ahead auction market-clearing process. Suppose the current time is 3
PM, and our broker needs to satisfy 10 MW of energy at 6 PM. We can see the optimal strategy
to purchase energy from this market is to bid with the right price in the last hour-ahead auction
(5 PM market) as it offers the lowest price than the previous two hour ahead auctions.
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4.2.2

Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)

MCTS [5] is a tree search algorithm that uses stochastic simulations, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
It incrementally builds a search tree using the following phases:
(i) Selection: The selection of the next state follows the UCT algorithm [36], which balances
between exploitation and exploration; (ii) Expansion: If a state is not in the tree it is added as
a new node, so the tree adds one node in each simulation; (iii) Simulation: After expansion,
actions are randomly selected from the action set to perform a rollout to the end of the game;
(iv) Backpropagation: After the simulation, each tree node that was visited during that game is
updated by increasing the visit counts and the expected value. These four phases represent one
MCTS simulation. After completing the specified number of MCTS simulations, the algorithm
selects the current action with the best value.

Figure 4.2: Monte Carlo Tree Search

4.3

Proposed Heuristic Bidding Policies

We observe the historical market clearing prices of periodic double auction markets. Figure 4.3
shows that the market clearing prices in an hour ahead periodic double auctions form a gaussian
distribution. Using this insight, we design our action space with two variables i.e., a mean value
(µ) and a standard deviation (σ). In the previous chapter, we learned price predictors to predict
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Figure 4.3: Gaussian distribution in PDA market clearing prices

Figure 4.4: Price Multipliers in MCTS action space.
market clearing prices in an hour ahead auction. Here we use these price predictors to estimate the
mean value of the distribution (µ). Then we find the average observed standard deviation of the
PDA market and use it as (σ). Thus we design our action space, shown in figure 4.4, using both µ
and σ to bid in an hour ahead auction. If we increase the bid price, we see from figure 4.4 that the
bid becomes more expensive/aggressive, which results in a higher probability of getting the bid
cleared in the auction or winning the specific auction. We now introduce two high-speed heuristic
bidding strategies for PDAs. These are based on the idea of adjusting the probability of winning
each auction, such that the cumulative probability of winning is above a given threshold. We
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consider only a single bid for each auction with the total volume that we want to purchase. Both
strategies begin by initializing the bidding prices for all auctions with some minimum probability
of winning (Pmin = 0.025 in our experiments). They then incrementally raise the bid price in
some auctions until the cumulative probability of winning reaches a given threshold.

4.3.1

C1 Strategy

Figure 4.5: C1 Strategy in a 3 hour ahead PDA market
C1 raises the probability of winning (and corresponding bid price) for each auction in a uniform, round-robin pattern such that all probabilities are roughly equal. As the number of bidding
opportunities decreases for a specific hour-ahead auction market, the C1 strategy increases its
aggressiveness. Figure 4.3.1 shows that all the 3 hour ahead auctions have the same probability value, and the agent selects the price as a limit price of the bid, which maps to the selected
probability value by the C1 strategy.
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4.3.2

C2 Strategy

C2 increases the bid limit price of the auction, which has the lowest predicted clearing price to
increase the probability of winning on that specific auction. This increases the probability of
winning the auctions with the lower (predicted) prices. This strategy is a risk-taking strategy that
looks for an opportunity to bid in the lowest clearing priced auctions at high limit prices. The
idea is to get the bid cleared with the lowest clearing price set by other bidding agents. Figure
4.3.2 shows that all the 3 hour ahead auctions have different probability values because they have
different market clearing prices. Auction 1 has the lowest predicted price, so C2 assigns a higher
probability value on that auction so that it can bid with a higher price, which can eventually help
the agent to clear its bid in the specific auction.

Figure 4.6: C2 Strategy in a 3 hour ahead PDA market
We stop the process when the multiplication of the individual probabilities of winning exceeds
the threshold. Both strategies will become more aggressive in later auctions when there are fewer
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future opportunities to buy. We show that both of these policies perform well as heuristics, but
they can also serve as the starting point for a more comprehensive search.

4.4

Proposed MCTS Bidding Strategy

We now design a more general search policy for finding good bids based on MCTS. Action:
We represent the main actions of the MCTS strategy as prices relative to the predicted distribution of clearing prices for the current auction. Each action actionm is represented by
{µ, σ, {∆min , ∆max }, γ}, where µ represents the limit price, σ is the observed standard deviation
of the clearing price distribution, {∆min , ∆max } is the minimum and maximum price multiplier
tuple, and γ is the volume (in %) of the current demand δ. We get the value for µ from one of
the price predictors. We estimate σ from 30 four-broker simulations, and record the standard
deviations of the errors in the predictions of the auctions. The ∆min and ∆max are used by the
mcts
agent to create µmcts
min and µmax by varying µ using:
mcts
µmcts
min = µ + ∆min ∗ σ and µmax = µ + ∆max ∗ σ

Using {∆min , ∆max }, µ, and σ, the MCTS strategy is able to simulate actions in different price
ranges. For example, if {∆max , ∆min } = {1, −1}, our MCTS strategy varies its bid prices in
the first standard deviation range as illustrated in Figure 4.4. An action is a NO-BID action
when γ = 0. For dynamic actions, we use an accurate price instead of price multipliers, where
mcts
µmcts
min = µmax . The idea here is that these dynamic actions should be able to hone in on more

“pinpoint” prices if they are selected during MCTS simulations.
State: States are nodes in the search tree representing the history of action choices. Each state
keeps a memory of its corresponding action-id, visit-count, and CavgU nit (i.e., total avg. unit cost
incurred by the agent in this auction and all future auctions). The agent selects the state that has
the highest UCT value while doing simulations. Each action leads to a specific state, so an agent
with an action-spacem size of m actions can go into m different states from a specific state.
n
n−1
Transition: A state Sm
transitions to one of the states in the next time period, S0n−1 , . . . , Sm
.
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Figure 4.7: MCTS Tree for the nth Hour-Ahead Auction Bidding
0
}. If there are m
Terminal State: The zero hour-ahead states are terminal states, {S00 , . . . , Sm

actions and n hour-ahead auctions, the search tree will have mn final states.
Reward: While doing rollouts/simulations for timeslot t, if the agent reaches a terminal state, it
gets the balancing cost Cbal,t as a reward, which corresponds to the price the agent would pay for
energy in the balancing market. Otherwise, it gets a simulated cost of Csim that is the sum of the
cost paid for energy in all of the auctions.
Simulation: While running a MCTS simulation for the nth hour-ahead auction, the agent first gets
the current demand (δtn ) and tries to clear δtn using a simulation of the market clearing process by
selecting action m. It generates a simulated market clearing price χnm,t from a Gaussian distribution where the mean is equal to µnt and standard deviation is σ. The results of non-deterministic
choices (i.e., auction clearing prices) are sampled in our MCTS, but these are continuous distributions so we do not model them explicitly as chance nodes with a finite number of outcomes. If
n
the bid’s limit price µmcts is greater than χnm,t , the bid gets cleared. If υm,t
volume is cleared in

this process, the agent updates its δtn for the remaining hour-ahead auction simulation by deductn
ing υm,t
from δtn and repeats the same process until it reaches the terminal state or a state where
n
n
δtn is zero. At each level of the hour-ahead auction, we get Csim,m,t
= χnm,t ∗ υm,t
.
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Rollout: If an agent reaches a state without children, the agent selects an action randomly, creates
a state, and adds it to the tree. Then it runs the random rollout process by picking actions randomly from the action space and traversing from the newly added state to a terminal state. When
it reaches a terminal state, it simulates a simplified balancing market and calculates the Cbal by
multiplying δtn with the unit balancing cost. At time slot t, the unit balancing cost is calculated by
doubling the maximum ask price (Askpricemax ) for that specific time slot’s hour-ahead auctions.
Cbal,t is defined by:
CbalU nitP rice,t = 2 ∗ Askpricetmax ± noiseGaussian
Cbal,t = CbalU nitP rice,t ∗ δtn
n
and Cbal,t , we get the total simulation cost Csim
Now, if we aggregate all the costs, i.e., Csim,m,t

for δtn amount of energy:
Csim =

n
X

i
Csim,m,t
+ Cbal,t

i=0

If we divide Csim by δtn , we get the unit cost CavgU nit i.e. CavgU nit = Csim /δtn . For each
state, we have a normalized value τ which we will use in our UCT formula. Here τ = 1 −
(CavgU nit /CbalU nitP rice,t ).
To select an action, we evaluate the states using the following UCT formula:
r
2 ∗ log(parent-visit-count)
λU CT = τ +
+
visit-count
where  is a small random number to break the ties. The agent selects the state that has the highest
λU CT value while doing simulations. After repeating a selected number of Nsim MCTS iterations
for the nth hour-ahead auction, the agent builds the tree as illustrated in Figure 4.7. Then it selects
n
the action that leads to the highest τ state Sm
from the root. After bidding according to the best

action, the agent discards the MCTS tree and builds it again from the scratch when it needs to bid
for the (n − 1)th hour-ahead auction. We discard the search trees after bidding because of most
information changes between auctions, including new weather predictions, broker behaviors, etc.,
rendering the previous search trees of little value. Our MCTS agent follows Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 MCTS Bidding Strategy
1: procedure MCTS(State cur, TimeSlot t, HourAhead n)
0

2:

δtn = δtn = GetDemand(t, n);

3:

while !HasReachedTerminalState(cur) or δtn > 0 do

0

4:

n0 = cur.HourAheadAuction;

5:

if HasUnvisitedChildStates(cur) then

6:

cur = selectChildRandomly(cur);

7:

expand(cur);
n0
n0
P
P
0
i
i
[ Csim,m,t , υm,t
] = rollout(δtn );

8:

i=0

i=0

Csim +=

9:

n0
P

i
Csim,m,t

;

0
δtn

-=

i=0

i
υm,t
;

i=0

break;

10:
11:

n0
P

else

12:

cur = selectChildByUCTValue(cur);

13:

n
n
[Csim,m,t
, υm,t
] = simulation(δtn );

14:

n
n
Csim += Csim,m,t
; δtn -= υm,t
;

15:

0

0

0

0

0

0

AddToVisited(cur);
0

16:

Csim += Cbal,t = CbalU nitP rice,t ∗ δtn ;

17:

CavgU nit = Csim /δtn ;

18:

backpropagation(CavgU nit , visitedNodes);
We denote our default MCTS agent as MCTSd . The default action space Action-Spaced for

MCTSd has five bid actions and one NO-BID action.
d
• Number-of-MCTS-simulation (Nsim
): The default number of MCTS iteration is set to

10,000.
• Bid-Volume (γd ): All actions bid with 100% of the current demand (except for NO-BID).
• Price-Multipliers {∆dmin , ∆dmax }: The five price multiplier tuples for the actions are as
follows: {−1, 0}, {0, 1}, {−1, 1}, {0, 1}, and {0, 2}.
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d
• Number-of-Bids (Nbid
):

Submits 10 bids.

9 bids are minimum bandwidth bids

mcts
(bidvolume = 0.001 mW) with limitprice starting from the µmcts
min to µmax . The 10th bid is

the main bid which is submitted at µmcts
max price.

4.5

Dynamic MCTS Strategy

An important restriction on MCTSd is that it searches only a fixed space of possible bidding
actions. Here, we consider a simple dynamic MCTS policy [6] that adds promising new actions
to the search space over time. In particular, at the time of reaching a specific threshold number of
iterations in the MCTS simulation, we add a new action, equal to the lowest simulated unit cost
price among all the children states of the root, to the action space. The simulated unit cost price
also includes the balancing price. The thresholds are set to 5%, 10%, 20%, and 50% of the total
MCTS simulations in the experiment. So, we add a total of 4 dynamic actions to the action space.
We denote this agent as MCTSdyn . An enhancement of the dynamic MCTS strategy is possible if
we can seed the initial action space with good, simple, and fast heuristic strategies.

4.6

Experimental Methods: Testbed

The Power TAC simulation is complex, and there are many factors in the performance of the
agents. We decouple the wholesale market from the other features of Power TAC to gain more
control and focus just on the performance of the bidding strategies in the wholesale PDA. We
implemented a controlled wholesale energy market simulator that imitates a variable number of
hour-ahead periodic double auctions (e.g., 24 hour-ahead auctions) as close as possible to Power
TAC wholesale energy market [31].

4.6.1

Setting Supply

In Power TAC simulation, the Grid Genco is an abstract entity that simulates a population of
generating facilities distributed over a large geographic area, such as the MISO or PJM ISO
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organizations in North America. It generates a supply curve that is composed of a succession
of ask orders with prices and quantities drawn from distributions that characterize the full price
curve observed in the MISO and/or PJM LMP markets. [31]. To set the supply, we collected
producer supply data by running 30 Power TAC simulations with 30 different bootstrap data and
calculate the average energy supply per hour.

4.6.2

Setting demand

Power TAC’s wholesale market simulates 11 different city demands. After observing several
simulations in Power TAC, we find that the ratio of energy supply and customer demand is nearly
300 for a city. So, to set the demand, we divide the average supply per hour by 300. This is a
low demand scenario where the wholesale market provides enough energy to the broker agents
to satisfy their demand. We equally distribute the demand to all the brokers in our games for
fairness.

4.6.3

Setting Forecasting Features

The demand is modeled on the regional demand observed in the north-central U.S. and is relatively weather-dependent. It simulates a region with cold winters and relatively hot summers,
and demand is more dependent on temperatures above the comfort zone than on temperatures
below the comfort zone. The Power TAC simulation provides wind speed, wind direction, cloud
coverage, and temperature forecasts for every hourAhead auctions. We collected these day-ahead
weather forecast data from the 30 simulations’ log and used it as forecasting features in our isolated simplified wholesale PDA simulator.

37

4.7
4.7.1

Benchmark Strategies
Zero Intelligence (ZI)

ZI agent [21] uses a straightforward strategy, generating random bid prices and ignoring the state
of the market. For a given unit, prices are drawn from a uniform distribution between the unit’s
limit price and a minimum allowable price for the buyer. ZI strategy uses the REPTree/MDP
price predictor to get a limit price µ. The bid price is drawn from a distribution where the mean
is µ, and the standard deviation is $10. The broker places only one bid with the quantity equal to
the demand at that specific time slot and hour-ahead auction.

4.7.2

Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP)

ZIP agent [65] maintains a scalar variable m denoting its desired profit margin and combines this
with a unit’s limit price to compute a bid or ask price p. For failed bids, the agent adjusts p in the
direction of beating the failed bid. The broker places only one bid according to the demand at that
specific time slot and hour-ahead auction. It uses the REPTree/MDP predictor to get a limit price
µ. The profit margin m is set to c% of µ. So, the bid price p = µ + µ ∗ c%. (In our experiments,
c = 1%). If a bid fails, then an offset value of q% of the µ is added to p. Otherwise, q is set to 0.
So, when a bid fails, bid price p = µ + µ ∗ c% + µ ∗ q%. (In our experiments, q = 10%).

4.7.3

TacTex

TacTex [70] is a broker in Power TAC. Using an online reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm,
TacTex procures to meet demand as cheaply as possible through the sequential bidding in the
wholesale market. TacTex models the sequential bidding as an MDP with a finite number of
states. The outcome is a sample-efficient online reinforcement learning algorithm that minimizes
procurement costs and helps the agent achieve state-of-the-art performance in competitions and
controlled experiments.
When TacTex uses its MDP price predictor, it starts a game with no data and learns to bid on-
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Algorithm 2 TacTex: Online RL Wholesale Market Strategy
1: neededEnergy[1...24]=ComputeNeededEnergy()
2:

densities[0...24] ← AddRecentTradesAndBalancing()

3:

if HasEnoughData(densities) then
limitPrice[1...24]=SolveMDP(densities)

4:
5:

else

6:

limitPrice[1...24]=RandomizedBiddingPolicy()

7:

SubmitBids(neededEnergy[1...24], limitPrices[1...24])

line, while acting. In each time slot, it solves the MDP, and its estimates are refined periodically.
This results in an online RL bidding strategy, which helps the agent to adapt and optimize its
bidding in different market conditions. TacTex’s bidding strategy is summarized in Algorithm 2.
When we use REPTree as a price predictor, a slight modification is needed in Algorithm 2.
REPTree is a supervised learning price predictor, and it predicts prices without densities. Therefore, lines 2 to 6 in the algorithm 2 are ignored, and the REPTree predicted prices are used
instead to fill the limitP rice[1...24] array.

4.8

Choosing the Default Price Predictor

From chapter 3, we see that our best candidate price predictor is REPTree price predictor. Now we
create training datasets to learn a REPTree price predictor in an environment where the abovestated strategies are present. First, we use four ZI brokers with a default mean price $30 and
default standard deviation $10 to generate bidding limit prices. We ran 30 simulations to generate
the initial training dataset. After that, we apply cross-validation on the training set to learn our
initial REPTree price predictor model, which we call REPTree-V0, using Weka [24]. Then,
we run another 50 simulations with the four strategies (ZI, ZIP, TacTex, and MCTS) using the
REPTree-V0 price predictor to generate an iteration one training dataset. We apply the same
cross-validation method to learn our REPTree-V1 price predictor. We follow the same procedure
again to create our REPTree-V2 predictor. The purpose of this to mitigate the dependencies
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of initial ZI agents’ fixed mean and standard deviation. After the second iteration of learning,
the correlation coefficient value does not improve significantly, so we use REPTree-V2 as our
REPTree price predictor in our experiments.

Figure 4.8: Price predictor accuracy comparison.
Figure 4.8 shows the per hour ahead percentage error comparison of both price predictors in
a single simulation. We can see that REPTree has better accuracy in predicting per hour ahead
of auction prices than the MDP predictor. MDP has an average error of 66.28% for the 24
auctions, where REPTree has 54.05%. The higher standard deviation of market-clearing price in
the middle hourAhead auctions results in a higher error rate for the price predictors in the middle.
Necessarily, there is much less bidding activity in these middle auctions, so the clearing prices
naturally vary much more. After this comparison, we choose REPTree (which is more accurate
than MDP predictor) as our default price predictor for the rest of the experiments.
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4.9

Experimental Results: MCTS Strategy Variations

MCTS is a statistical anytime algorithm, so more computation time should lead it to better performance [4]. To investigate the effects of additional simulations and the specification of the action space, we did experiments varying three important action space properties
(Nsim , γand{∆min , ∆max }) of MCTSd against the three benchmark strategies. First, we vary
the number of MCTS iterations (Nsim ) for the default configuration. Then, we vary the volume percentage (γ) but keeping the price multipliers {∆min , ∆max} fixed. Finally, we vary the
{∆min , ∆max} but keep the γ fixed.

4.9.1

Varying Number of MCTS Simulations

We vary the Nsim of MCTSd by 10, 100, 500, 1K, 2K, 5K, 10K & 15K and run 30 four broker (ZI,
ZIP, TacTex, and MCTS) games. As the states are being visited more with a higher number of

Figure 4.9: Net cost comparison of MCTSd by varying Nsim
MCTS simulations, we can see that the performance of the MCTSd improves when we increase
Nsim in Fig. 4.9.
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4.9.2

Varying Volume in Action Space

In this experiment, we set {∆min , ∆max } to {0, 1} (an optimistic range to clear a bid) for MCTSd .
By varying the γ only in the action space, we experiment with 3 action-spaces which are as
follows:
• Action-Spacevv-2 consists of 2 actions: 1 bid-action with a γ of 100%, and 1 NO-BID
action.
• Action-Spacevv-3 consists of 3 actions: 2 bid-actions where γ is varied by 100% and 50%,
and one NO-BID action.
• Action-Spacevv-6 consists of 6 actions:

5 bid-actions where γ is varied by

100%,80%,60%,40%,20%, and one NO-BID action.
The main motivation of this experiment is to investigate how MCTS takes advantage of different
γ scenarios. We name the agents according to their action-space name. Fig 4.10 shows that

Figure 4.10: Net cost comparison of MCTS by varying volume.
MCTSvv-2 does very well comparing to the other two variations. This is because the number of
visits per state is much higher in Action-Spacevv-2 as it contains fewer actions than others. It
also demonstrates that procuring energy at a full volume at the right moment is a very effective
strategy.
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4.9.3

Varying Price in Action Space

In this experiment, we want to select a pinpoint price selection and bid with a full volume action
space for the agent. So we keep the value of Nbid to 1 and γ to 100% fixed for MCTSd . We set
∆min , &∆max to the same value and vary them with different values for different pin point price
selection. We experiment with 3 action-spaces which are as follows:
• Action-Spacevp-2 consists of 2 actions. 1 bid-action with price multiplier of {0, 0} and one
NO-BID action.
• Action-Spacevp-4 consists of 4 actions. 3 bid-actions with price multiplier of {−1, −1},
{0, 0}, and {1, 1} and one NO-BID action.
• Action-Spacevp-6 consists of 6 actions.

5 bid-actions with price multiplier of

{−2, −2},{−1, −1}, {0, 0}, {1, 1}, and {2, 2} and one NO-BID action.

Figure 4.11: Net cost comparison of MCTS by varying price.
From Fig. 4.11, we can see that MCTSvp-6 performs very well compared to other two variations.
This shows that a high range of pinpoint price selection option is more effective than having a
low range of options.
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4.9.4

Final Comparison

We select the two best candidate agents MCTSvv-2 and MCTSvp-6 from previous action space
experiments and run 30 four broker (ZI, ZIP, TacTex, and MCTS) game for both agents by varying
Nsim . Fig 4.12 demonstrates that MCTSvp-6 is doing very well compared to other strategies with

Figure 4.12: Net cost comparison of best candidate agents.
increasing Nsim where it is able bid and procure the bid-volume at a lower price. So, the MCTS
strategy with a higher number of MCTS simulation and a reasonably wide range of pinpoint price
selection option can be considered as the best variation of MCTS. Following these two policies,
the MCTS agent simulates the auctions with accurate prices by a higher number of simulations
and makes good decisions to bid at the right moment to procure the full demand. We now denote
this configuration of MCTS agent as MCTSstatic , since this agent has a fixed number of actions (5
bid actions and 1 NO-BID action).

4.10

Candidate Strategy Comparison

To find the best bidding strategy for the agent, we conducted an empirical analysis for six bidding
strategies: ZI, ZIP, TacTex, C1, C2, and MCTSstatic . We experimented with four-broker games,
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Figure 4.13: Net cost comparison of becnhmark & candidate strategies.
where three brokers were always fixed to be ZI, ZIP, and TacTex. We ran 20 sample games using
20 different boot files that were not used to train the price predictor.
Figure 4.13 shows the performance of the benchmark and candidate strategies. We can see
that the C1 and C2 heuristics perform significantly better than ZI, ZIP, and TacTex.

4.11

Dynamic MCTS Comparison

Figure 4.14 demonstrates that MCTSdyn is doing better than MCTSstatic because of the additional
actions that are added to the action space dynamically at several threshold iteration values. To
reduce the size of the action space and make the agent more effective in searching the price space,
we introduce C1 and C2 as initial action selection strategies inside the MCTSdyn agent. We use
them before even starting MCTS to decide which actions will be in the action set considered by
MCTS in each state. We name them accordingly as MCTSdyn-C1 and MCTSdyn-C2 . Figure 4.13
shows that the C2 strategy performs better than the C1 strategy when we run them separately
against the three benchmark strategies. C2 tries to exploit the opportunity when the clearing price
is low. Figure 4.14 shows that when we seed C2 strategy into the MCTSdyn agent, it performs
better than all of the other agents.
Having fewer actions in the action space has the advantage of having a more significant number of visits per state, which is suitable for stabilizing the average values of the MCTS simula-
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Figure 4.14: Net Cost Comparison of C2 and all MCTS Variations
tion. Having specific actions in small action space is critical. The initial action created by C2
is more accurate to clear the bid in the low priced hour-ahead auctions than C1, and that is why
MCTSdyn-C2 is doing significantly better than the other strategies. We found that our MCTSdyn
algorithm takes approximately 0.072 seconds to build a 24 hour-ahead MCTS tree with 10k iterations. We have also analyzed the runtime of MCTSdyn-C2 algorithm, and it is 1.23 times faster
than the second-best MCTSdyn strategy. This gives an advantage to this strategy in high-frequency
trading as it can do more simulations in a limited amount of time.
Finally, our results demonstrate that an MCTS strategy with a more significant number of
MCTS simulations, seeded with a reasonably accurate small action space and dynamic action
addition, can be considered as the best variation of MCTS. Following these three policies, the
MCTS agent simulates the auctions with accurate prices by a higher number of simulations and
makes good decisions to bid at the right moment to procure the full demand.

4.12

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we have mainly proposed a novel approach for bidding in periodic double auctions
using Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). We have also proposed a way to seed the initial action
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space on the MCTS strategy using some simple heuristics. In the next chapter, we will do an
empirical evaluation of this bidding strategy.
We have evaluated the performance of our proposed bidding strategy against two widely
known baselines and the current state-of-the-art PDA bidding strategy. Our MCTS bidding strategy shows significant improvement over the baselines and the state-of-the-art strategy. We conducted an empirical analysis to explore ways to improve the MCTS strategy. We also present a
fast heuristic strategy that can be used either as a standalone method or as an initial set of bids
to seed the MCTS policy. The specification of the action space has a significant effect on MCTS
performance, and our experiments guide what features of the actions are most important. Our results show (unsurprisingly) that MCTS performs better with a more significant number of MCTS
simulations, and dynamically adding actions during the search process with proper action seeding can significantly improve the agent performance. As part of the future work, there are scopes
for finding a kernel regression-based dynamic action adding algorithm with plans to introduce
non-determinism.
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Chapter 5
Learning Strategies in Dynamic Retail
Market
The Power TAC environment offers brokers the ability to issue several different types of tariffs
three times per simulation day. Each tariff may be as elaborate or simple as the broker desires
though each tariff can only target a single power type such as consumption or production. The
most straightforward type of tariff one may issue is a flat rate tariff that offers a single price per
kWh to subscribers. From there, the tariff may be augmented with signup bonuses, or a minimum
subscription duration and early termination fee. Tariffs may also be customized to offer tiered
usage pricing, time of use pricing, or a daily fee in addition to usage pricing. Tariffs may be
issued, revoked, or modified at any time, though the new tariffs will only become available for
subscription at the designated 6-hour intervals. A tariff is modified by publishing a new tariff
with the superseding flag set to the old tariff and then revoking the old tariff. Our broker issued
a single, simplified flat-rate tariff at the beginning of the game and modified it throughout the
simulation by superseding the past tariff and revoking the past tariff.
To publish effective tariffs so that we gain both the most subscribers, henceforth referred to as
market-share, and the highest net balance, we applied standard reinforcement learning techniques
to try to learn an effective policy for modifying prices based on observations of the market. This
technique is chosen because we want the agent to learn to react in such a way that it gains the best
possible reward with little direct input from the agent designers. To achieve this goal, we modeled
this problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [37] and utilize the Q-Learning algorithm [1]
to learn a good policy. Q-Learning involves an iterative process whereby the SPOT agent plays
many simulations, continually updating the Q-Value for a given state, action pair. Q-Learning
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will continue to improve the Q-Values until convergence is obtained where the Q-Values for each
state, action pair change very little per iteration. In order to expedite the convergence of the QLearning algorithm, we implemented a distributed system that allowed many simulations to be
run simultaneously.

5.1

Formulating the Problem as an MDP

Recall that in the tariff market, the goal is to design tariffs that will result in the broker agent’s
highest profit. We investigate a restricted version of the problem, assuming that the broker can
only offer flat-rate tariffs, i.e., the price per kWh is uniform across all time steps. However, the
broker can vary the price of the flat-rate tariff by having the objective to maximize the profit.
This problem can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [37], defined by the tuple
hS, s0 , A, T, Ri:
• A set of states S. In our problem, we define the set of states to be all possible pairs of
hM S, Bali, where M S is the percentage of market share controlled by our agent (i.e., the
percentage of customers that are subscribing to our agent) and Bal is the overall profit or loss
since the start of the simulation (i.e., the amount of money in the “bank”). We discretized
M S from 0% to 100% in increments of 5% and Bal from −e2,000,000 to e8,000,000 in
increments of e20,000.
• A start state s0 ∈ S. In our problem, the start state is always h0%, e0i since the agent does not
have any subscribers to its tariff and starts with no initial profit or loss.
• A set of actions A. In our problem, the agent’s first action is to publish a new flat-rate tariff at
e15 per kWh. Subsequent actions are from the following set of actions:
↑: Increase the price of the tariff by e2.00 per kWh. This is implemented by publishing a new
tariff at a higher price and revoking the previous lower-priced tariff.
↔: Keep the price of the tariff. This is implemented by not publishing or revoking any tariffs.
↓: Decrease the price of the tariff by e2.25 per kWh. This is implemented by publishing a new
tariff at the lower price and revoking the previous higher-priced tariff.
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• A transition function T : S×A×S → [0, 1] that gives the probability T (s, a, s0 ) of transitioning
from state s to s0 when action a is executed. In our problem, the transition function is not
explicitly defined and transitions are executed by the Power TAC simulator.
• A reward function R : S × A × S → R+ that gives the reward R(s, a, s0 ) of executing action
a in state s and arriving in state s0 . In our problem, the reward is the gain or loss in profits of
the agent, determined by the Power TAC simulator.
A solution to an MDP is a policy π, which maps states to actions. Solving an MDP is to find an
optimal policy, that is, a policy with the most significant expected reward.

(a) Against Inferior Agents

(b) Against Similar Agents

(c) Against Superior Agents

(d) Against Random Agents

Figure 5.1: Convergence Rates

5.2

Learning a Tariff Pricing Policy

We now describe how to learn an effective policy for the MDP using Q-learning [1]. We initialize the Q-values of all state-action pairs Q(s, a) to 1,000,000 in order to better encourage
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(a) Against Inferior Agents

(b) Against Similar Agents

(c) Against Superior Agents

(d) Against Random Agents

Figure 5.2: Explored States
exploration [1] and use the following update rule to update the Q-values after executing action a
from state s and transitioning to state s0 :


0

0

0

0

Q(s, a) ← (1 − α)Q(s, a) + α R(s, a, s ) + γ · max
Q (s , a )
0
a ∈A


(5.1)

where α = 0.9 is the learning rate and γ = 1.0 is the discount factor.
Parallelizing the learning process: In order to increase the robustness of the resulting learned
policy, we executed the learning algorithm with ten different simulation bootstrap files [41]. The
different bootstrap files may contain different combinations of types of users, with different energy consumption profiles, energy generation capabilities, etc. To speed up the learning process,
we parallelize the Q-learning algorithm by running multiple instances of the simulation. We run
the simulations in groups of 10 instances, where each instance in the group uses one of the ten
unique bootstrap files. Instead of using and updating their local Q-values, all these instances will
use and update the same set of Q-values stored on a central database. Once the simulation of
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(a) Against Inferior Agents

(b) Against Similar Agents

(c) Against Superior Agents

(d) Against Random Agents

Figure 5.3: Comparison against Opposing Agents
one of the instances ends (the Power TAC simulation can end any time between 1440 to 1800
simulated hours), it will restart with the same bootstrap file from the first time step again.

5.3

Experimental Results

In our experiments, we learn policies against two opposing agents; this scenario corresponds to
the 3-agent scenario in the previous Power TAC competition. We characterized possible opposing
agents according to their relative competitiveness in the previous years’ Power TAC competitions.
We learned four different sets of Q-values and, equivalently, four different sets of policies against
four different types (in terms of their competitive level) of opposing agents:
• S UPERIOR AGENTS: AgentUDE15 and Maxon15.
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• S IMILAR AGENTS: Mertacor and COLDPower.
• I NFERIOR AGENTS: TacTex14 and CWIBroker14.
• R ANDOM AGENTS: Two randomly chosen agents from the set of 6 agents above.

5.3.1

Convergence Rates

Figure 5.1 shows the convergence rates for all of the scenarios, where the y-axis shows the final
balance at the last time step for each iteration. SPOT can learn better policies and improve
its final balance with more iterations. To reach convergence, SPOT takes various numbers of
iterations, according to opponents. SPOT sees the most variance in games where the opponents
are randomized. Against a setlist of opponents, policy convergence is reached in a limited number
of iterations. For example, after approximately 200 iterations, convergence is reached against
superior brokers.

5.3.2

Explored States

Figure 5.2 illustrates the explored states in the same scenarios. The color of each state represents
the number of times the actions for each state were explored, ranging from black, where all three
actions were explored the most, to white, where no actions were explored. The figure shows
that more states and actions were explored against inferior agents than against superior agents.
Additionally, these results also explain the performance of the agent; against superior agents, our
agent was very limited in the states it was able to explore, most times being unable to gain more
than 5% of the market share. When it did get a significant amount, it was often at a loss. Thus, it
took its best actions and maintained a balance of approximately e50,000.

5.3.3

Comparison against Opposing Agents

We evaluated the learned policies against the same set of opposing agents. Figure 5.3 shows
the profit in the tariff market alone of each agent over the various time steps. These results are
averaged over five different bootstrap files (different from those used in the learning process) and
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three runs per bootstrap file. These results are consistent with the final converged results shown
in Figure 5.1, where our agent does better against inferior agents than against superior agents.

5.3.4

Profit in the Tariff Market per Timeslot

Figure 5.4: Profit in the Tariff Market per Timeslot
Figure 5.4 plots the performance of our agent with each of the four learned policies in addition
to an agent with no learned strategy against each pair of opposing agents. The results show that
the agent with the policy learned by playing against a specific pair of opponents do best when
playing against the same pair of opponents (e.g., the agent with the policy learned through playing
against superior agents does better than other policies when playing against superior agents). The
policy learned by playing against random agents is more robust against different opponent types,
especially compared with the policy learned through playing against superior agents.

5.4

Chapter Summary

The strategy learned by tabular Q-learning fails to achieve the highest profits against the other
rival agents. A possible reason for this is that the agent cannot capture the past state accurately
because we have a very highly discretized state space and a limited number of market features
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(i.e., our states are too generalized). The action space is also minimal compared with the full
action space. Both of these restrictions were necessary for defining the MDP because we have a
limited amount of data to learn a policy due to the high computational and time cost for running
simulations. We see that policy learned against specific opponents do best. It is also interesting to
note that other than the superior agent pair with which it trained, the agent with the superior agent
training does better only than the baseline agent against all other pairs. This could be because this
is the agent with the least explored states and is thus unable to make wise decisions. In contrast,
the policy learned by playing against random agents is more robust towards different opponent
types, especially random and superior agents.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Game Theoretic Methods to
Minimize Regret Against Specific
Opponents in Retail Markets
6.1

Introduction

We need to be able to learn better strategies than in the previous chapter by getting much more
data more quickly and being able to train strategies with richer state and action spaces. We plan to
use a simplified simulator to dramatically increase the amount of training data that can access to
learn these policies and do strategic analysis. We also want to be able to account for the strategic
nature of the game, so we will learn a portfolio of different strategies that will do well against
different types of opponents; a one size fits all strategy is not enough for this domain. These
motivate the use of empirical game theory to analyze the games, with an improved set of RL
methods for learning candidate strategies.
Game theory plays a fundamental role in analyzing multi-agent interactions in complex systems [68]. Economists often use game theory to understand competitive market behavior, where
it helps to predict when people engage in certain behaviors, such as price-fixing and price-war
[18]. Walsh et al. [73, 74] and Wellman et al. [77] shows that by using a restricted set of heuristic strategies and empirical game theoretic analysis we can examine the agent interactions at a
higher meta-level, instead of trying to analyze the interactions between all of the possible detailed strategies. In this analysis paradigm, we create a restricted game with fewer, more abstract
strategies that form a game model that is more tractable for analysis. We then iteratively try to
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find additional stronger strategies that can be added to this restricted game model to improve the
overall analysis. Researchers have applied these methods to no limit Texas hold ’em poker and
many types of double auctions [28, 66, 50, 51, 67] and found novel insights in complex systems.
In this chapter, our objective is to find better retail strategies in a complex multi-agent retail
market. We decided to apply this promising set of techniques to design new effective strategies.
One of the limitations of the empirical game-theoretic approach is that it becomes tough and timeconsuming to find the convergence strategy with a vast strategy space it becomes computationally
expensive to explore the full game to find true equilibrium strategies or perform other types of
analysis. Moreover, it is not guaranteed to perform near optimally with a single strategy when
facing different classes of opponents. Here we propose an algorithm that can outperform others
in regret analysis and converge faster than conventional EGTA methods to find new strategies.

6.2

Background: Game Theory and Machine Learning

Game theory is the method of representing the strategic interplay between two or more players
in a position containing set rules and results.

6.2.1

Normal-form game

A (finite, n-person) normal-form game is a tuple (N, A, u), where:
1. N is a finite set of n players, indexed by i
2. A = A1 An , where Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i. Each vector a =
(a1 , ..., an ) ∈ A is called an action profile;
3. u = (u1 , ..., un ) where ui : A → R is a real-valued utility (or payoff) function for player i.
A natural way to represent games is through an n-dimensional matrix.
In a two-dimensional example in table 6.1, each row represents player 1, each column representing an action for player 2, and each cell represents one possible outcome. Each player’s
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Table 6.1: A normal form game
C

D

C

-1,-1

-4,0

D

0,-4

-3,-3

utility for an outcome is written in the cell corresponding to that outcome, where player 1’s utility
listed first. [42]. There are normal form games that have some correlation to the retail trading
problem [46].
Iterated Prisoners Dilemma
The issue of publishing tariffs resembles a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. In a standard version of
the game, two prisoners are interrogated separately about a bank robbery. If one confesses to
the theft and the other does not, the one who confesses is released, and the other receives a stiff
sentence. If both confess, they receive moderate sentences. If neither confesses, they receive
mild sentences for a lesser crime. Each player follows a dominant strategy, a strategy that is
the player’s best response, the one with the highest payoff, no matter what strategy the other
player chooses. Assuming at an atmosphere of distrust and competition, the dominant strategy
equilibrium of the game is for both prisoners to confess, even though the Pareto superior outcome,
the one in which neither party can be made better off, is for both to keep quiet [46].
The prisoner’s dilemma is a game that shows the reason for two entirely rational individuals
not cooperating. Even if we can see that it is in their best interests to support each other, they
will not collaborate because of trust issues. In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, two players play
this game repeatedly, and they have perfect recall of their taken actions and change their strategy
accordingly. Table 6.2 represents a single shot prisoners dilemma if the payoffs support the
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + P property.
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Table 6.2: Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Payoff Matrix
C

D

C

R, R

S, T

D

T, S

P, P

Repeated Coordination Games
A game is a coordination game, if the following inequalities hold in the payoff matrix for the row
player: A > B, D > C, and for the column player: a > c, d > b. We can find multiple pure
Table 6.3: Repeated Coordination Games Payoff Matrix
Left

Right

Up

A, a

B, b

Down

C, c

D, d

strategy nash equilibria in coordination games where players choose the same or corresponding
strategies. When this game is played in succession, we call it a repeated coordination game. The
retail pricing game is a complex game where agents play different games at different timeslots
where opponent agents’ actions decide which specific game the agent needs to play. This payoff
matrix structure determines which games the agents are playing, and their corresponding taken
action can make a transition from one game to another game. At a particular timeslot, other
example games retailer can play or transition into are “The Tragedy of the Common”, “The
Boxed Pigs” etc. [46].

6.2.2

Meta Game

A meta game is a reduced model of a complex interaction. In order to analyze complex games
like, e.g., poker, we do not need to consider all possible policies but a set of relevant metastrategies that are frequently played [51, 68]. Meta strategy means a set of actions that are taken
by the agent while playing the complex game. We can model the strategic interaction between
two retail traders as a two-player meta game G = (S, U). In the rest of the dissertation, we refer to
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the meta-strategy as a strategy, and we do not consider analyzing the atomic level action strategy
per timeslot.
The traders simultaneously select one pure strategy, each from a finite strategy set S where
U is the utility function. Initially, the retail strategy set S is a set of heuristics taken from prior
works.

6.2.3

Empirical Game Theory

We can estimate the payoff of a strategy by simulating a complex game, such as stock market
games, cybersecurity games, and trading agent competitions, instead of analyzing the complex
game [80]. For example, agents in a stock market place order sequentially, and interact via
complicated market rules, such that the only way to determine the outcome of multiple agents’
interacting strategies is to simulate their outcome in the market. We often use an environment
simulator to determine the payoffs for interacting strategies in such markets. The simulator can
take a strategy profile and return a real-valued payoff for each agent i. In this work, I search
for Nash equilibria of simulation-based games, which is a part of the field of empirical gametheoretic analysis, or EGTA [77, 78].
To give an introduction of EGTA, suppose there is a simulation-based game G = (S, U )
with N players, where the payoffs are available only by sampling a simulator S. As each agent’s
strategy set Si is continuous, it may be beneficial to analyze a restricted game G0 = (S 0 , U 0 ) with
10 strategies per agent. The first step in the EGTA process is to sample payoffs from simulator
S for many strategy profiles s. We typically collect many samples for ps ∼ S(s) ∈ RN for
each profile s. The greater the number of samples collected per profile, the more accurate the
resulting model becomes. After collecting payoff samples ps ∼ S(s) for various profiles s, we
can estimate the expected payoff for each agent of profile s by taking the sample mean ps . Then
we can construct an empirical game G00 = (S 0 , U 00 ) by combining the estimated expected payoffs
for many profiles wherein G00 , U 00 (s) = ps by definition. It is still often possible to find Nash
equilibria of G00 , even if the empirical game G00 has some missing payoffs. In such a case, the
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equilibrium profile must be an equilibrium of the restricted game G0 also, in the infinite-sample
limit where sampling error vanishes [80]. We terminate the EGTA procedure when an equilibrium
profile s is found and returned.

6.2.4

Deep Reinforcement Learning

The Power TAC simulator has a nearly real-world retail market with a high dimensional state
and strategy space. In the previous chapter, we applied a standard tabular Q-learning method to
learn new retail strategies. The state and strategy space is so vast that tabular Q-learning cannot
do well against all strategies where, in recent times, deep learning can overcome this problem.
Deep reinforcement learning uses a neural network as a function approximator instead of storing
the q-values. It has been successfully solving extensive-form games like Go, chess, and shogi
[59, 60] by learning superhuman strategies.

6.2.5

Double-oracle and empirical game-theoretic methods

A double-oracle method solves a two-player game iteratively with a finite set of strategies. By this
method, we solve the game and use an oracle for each player to derive the best-response strategy
against the current equilibrium opponent. Eventually, the method converges to equilibrium when
there is no better response exists. We can use deep learning algorithms as oracles for a player to
learn the best-response strategy.

6.3

Proposed Method

In the DO-EGTA method, we seek to get a newly learned strategy that can maximize the payoff
against all of the strategies in the current set. History Aware Double Oracle EGTA (HADOEGTA) proposes a modification of DO-EGTA where the algorithm keeps track of previous equilibrium strategies and learn a new DQN strategy over the mix-strategies of current and previous
equilibriums [80]. All of these methods try to learn a single strategy that will maximize the payoff
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over all the strategies in the strategy set. However, all these techniques do not help us to exploit
some specific set of candidate strategies while we play the game.

Figure 6.1: Double Oracle EGTA concept
In the standard double oracle EGTA process, we find an equilibrium point from a set of
candidate strategies in the restricted game and try to learn the best response strategy to it. We
continue this process until we can learn a final strategy, which gives us a positive deviation over
all equilibria, or it fails to converge. In figure 6.1, we see a conceptual diagram of DO-EGTA
with three types of contours. The solid contour is w.r.t. previous-previous opponent, the dashed
contour is w.r.t. previous opponent and the dotted contour is w.r.t. current opponent, which
shows how the current strategy is moving forward from learning against different equilibria to
the ultimate strategy. Blue pentagons are the points where DO-ETGA converges to a specific set
of strategies, and the red circle is the point where it converges to the last strategy.
The problem can arise when we have a large strategy space where we need to do many iterations to converge. In figure 6.2, we can see there is one single red circle, which is the ultimate
strategy, and to find the ultimate single strategy which wins over all the equilibrium is timeconsuming. Moreover, it is evident that the last learned strategy, in figure 6.2, will be able to do
well against all the previous equilibriums. However, it is not guaranteed that it can effectively
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Figure 6.2: Double Oracle EGTA concept in high strategy space
exploit them, which is one of the main limitations of the DO-EGTA method for this domain.
We propose a new method called “Clustered Double Oracle EGTA” (CDO-EGTA), where we
try to overcome this limitation. In a duopoly environment, when agents are playing against each
other, they can have some action preferences. As the strategies are some probability distribution
of actions, there might be some inner correlation between many strategies that may help us to
cluster them. We propose an algorithm that finds the candidate strategies’ inner correlations to
cluster them in some groups and applies the DO-EGTA on each group to find a mapping of BR
strategies. In the conceptual diagram of CDO-EGTA in figure 6.3, we can see that we have
successfully clustered the strategies into four groups by learning the inner correlation. For each
group, we have learned a separate ultimate strategy marked by the red circle. By doing this, we
are reducing the strategy space, which results in faster convergence. Moreover, we can expect
better exploitation than the DO-EGTA method as we learn different ultimate strategies based on
different sets of similar types of strategies.
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Figure 6.3: Clustered Double Oracle EGTA concept in high strategy space

6.4

Retail Game Model / Simulation Environment

We need a faster abstract simulator that can quickly simulate the Power TAC retail market to
produce data as the Power TAC simulator is slow and complex. The newly isolated simulator
can run faster and better estimate the core dynamics of retail strategies. Using the abstract retail
simulator, we can apply EGTA and create the payoff values for the retail meta game. This section
focuses on formulating the retail trading problem as a game using game-theoretic concepts and
creating an isolated retail simulator.

6.4.1

Formal Definition of Retail Pricing Game

We define the retail energy trading market as a stochastic simultaneous sequential decision making game (3SDMG) as follows:
• A finite set of players N = {1, 2, ....n}.
• A state space M where a state m is defined by a set of features {f1 , f2 , ..., fx } using the
domain knowledge. The features can be time, players’ public and private information etc.
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• Each player i has an action set (Ai ), where an action (a) is a real number in +P Pmax ≥
a ≥ −P Pmax continuous range. Here P Pmax is the maximum energy price in the market.
• Players can select a strategy (s) which can be pure or mixed using their own action set
at anytime. A pure strategy is playing only one action with probability 1, where a mix
strategy is playing several actions with a probability distribution. At time t, each player
i ∈ N chooses a strategy (sit ) from their strategy set S i .
• At time t, each player i plays only one action in the game from their selected strategy which
we call move or outcome action (oit ∈ Ot ).
• Action profiles consist of all the outcome actions or moves chosen by individual players
defined as O = A1 × A2 × ... × An .
• The payoffs of players are defined by a payoff function which maps each state and move
profile to a real number, g : M × O → IRN where the ith coordinate of g, g i , is the payoff
to player i as a function of the state m and move profile o (o ∈ O).
• Players have preferences over the payoffs, denoted as i . For player k, any move profile oi
and oj , oi k oj iff g k (m, oi ) ≤ g k (m, oj ).
• At time t + 1, players fully observe the move profile ot and partially observe mt . A player’s
cost, profit, market shares etc are the private information which is not shared with others
which makes it a imperfect information game.
• At time t + 1, players partially observe mt state where the game starts at some initial state
m1 at time t = 1. Players then simultaneously choose a strategy sit ∈ S i , play moves
oit ∈ ot , and customers (nature) selects mt+1 based on the current state mt and move
profile ot according to the probability P (.|mt , ot ).
• Players have a perfect recall so each player keeps a history (H) of move profiles and visible
features (m̂) of a state m where Ht+1 = {o1 , m̂1 , o2 , m̂2 ..., ot , m̂t }.
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• A play of this game m1 , o1 , ..., mt , ot defines a stream of payoffs g1 , g2 , ..., gt where gt =
g(mt , ot ) and each player i has a stream of strategies {si1 , s22 , ..., sit } which we call a meta
strategy (SM ).
• A t time-step game the payoff for player i is g̃ti =

1
t

Pt

n=1

gti

So an instance of a game can be represented by the tuple (N, S, H, P, i , t), and each player
i, tends to find a meta-strategy in order to maximize the payoff g̃ti .

6.4.2

Customer Model

Consumers are the main components in the retail market alongside other retailers, where they
define the transition function and determines the revenue of a retailer. A consumer can have two
basic properties that affect their behaviors. The properties are inertia and rationality. These two
factors affect how the customer is subscribing to a broker’s product.
Customer Inertia factor
The inertia factor defines how frequently the customers should evaluate market tariffs. Customers
do not always evaluate tariffs when given the opportunity. They can ignore tariff publications
considering them junk mails. When a broker changes the tariff price, a subscribed customer
resets its inertia variable. Resetting inertia gives the flavor of customer loyalty until the broker
changes the tariff prices in the market, preventing the customer from changing subscription. So
the inertia (I) is a probability I ∈ [0, 1], which determines if a customer will evaluate the tariffs in
the market at a particular timeslot. To model the market opening at the beginning of a simulation,
we expect customers to be paying attention. So the actual inertia parameter Ia must start with the
value of 0 as Ia = (1 − 2−n )I where n is a count of tariff publication cycle starting from 0.
Customer Rationality
If customers are entirely rational, the agent with the best prices always gets all the market share
over time. Otherwise, the best price agent sometimes loses some market share. An overall tariff
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choice does not necessarily follow a deterministic choice of the highest utility value, because
customers can be irrational in their decision making. We follow a smoother decision rule based
on multinomial logit choice for customer decision-making in choosing tariffs. The logit choice
model assigns probabilities to each tariff ti , from the set of evaluated tariffs T , as follows:
eλui
λut
t∈T e

Pi = P

The parameter λ is a measure of how rationally a customer chooses tariffs: λ = 0 represents
random, irrational choice, while λ = ∞ means perfectly rational. In our experiments we control
this using variable R where random is R = 0, perfect rational is R = 1.0

6.4.3

Heuristic Candidate Strategies

A straightforward multi-shot retail market can be compared to an iterative prisoner’s dilemma
game if the customers have rationality 1 and inertia 0 where the payoffs support the T > R >
P > S and 2R > T + P property. We adapted the IPD policies from the iterative prisoner’s
dilemma literature to the retail pricing game. We also extracted policies from other related domains like auction theory and used them as heuristics.
Zero Intelligence (ZI)
The ZI strategy generates bids at random prices drawn from a uniform distribution. It does not
keep a memory of how the agent performed in the previous timeslots.
Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP)
ZIP strategy tries to remember their failed bid prices, and in the next round, they bid with a more
competitive price so that they make more profits.
GD
GD, proposed by Gjerstad and Dickhaut [8], bids based on historical data from the market and
maintains a belief function representing the probability of its profit up to current timeframe. For
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a buyer, the belief function for all the actions is P r where
RGD
P ri = P
j∈N Rj
At a specific timeslot t, P ri is defined as the success probability of action i where RGD is the
revenue earned by GD agent. This strategy always updates its belief probability by the new values
by replacing the old values and selects the best action by a greedy lookup on all probability values
of all actions while bidding.
Tit for Tat Class
TFT [53] cooperates on the first move, then copies the opponents last move. We can have two
variations of TFT based on their generosity. Tit for Two Tats (TF2T) Cooperates on the first
move, and defects only when the opponent defects two times. Two Tits for Tat (2TFT) Same as
Tit for Tat except that it defects twice when the opponent defects.
Hard Majority
HardMj [44] non-cooperate on the first move, and non-cooperate if the number of noncooperations of the opponent is greater than or equal to the number of times it has cooperated,
otherwise cooperate.
Soft Majority
SoftMj [44] cooperates on the first move and cooperates as long as the number of times the rival
has cooperated higher than or equal to the number of times it has defected, else its defects.
Grim
Grim [20] cooperates until the opponent defects, and after that, always defects.
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General Heuristic Strategies Based on Actions
Always Increase (AlI) Cooperates on every move. Always Decrease (AlD) Defects on every
move Always Same (AlS) No change on every move.
Prober
Starts with D, C, C, and then defects if the opponent has cooperated in the second and third
moves; otherwise, it plays TFT.
Naive Prober
Like Tit for Tat, but occasionally defects with a small probability.
Pavlov
Pavlov [38] cooperates on the first move. If a reward or temptation payoff is received in the last
round, then it repeats the last choice, otherwise chooses the opposite choice.
By formulating the retail trading problem as a game and creating a simulator to play this game
with all these heuristic strategies, we now have the proper framework for running experiments
to find new retail strategies using existing methods. The next section explains the experimental
setup of the isolated retail simulator and the configurations of Deep RL.

6.5
6.5.1

Experimental Setup
Isolated Retail Simulator Setup

Candidate Broker Action Space
All the brokers can play three actions to change the prices at a certain time step in the isolated
retail simulator.
1. Decrease (-0.01 $ per KWH) (Non-Cooperative action)
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2. Increase (+0.01 $ per KWH) (Cooperative action)
3. No change (Cooperative action)
We also have introduced the random walk cost [34] for the brokers to simulate the purchase cost
of the energy from the wholesale market.

Figure 6.4: Isolated Retail Market Example
Ct is the target cost for timeslot t issued in the market segment. We vary Ct using a trend τ
that is updated by a random walk:
Ct+1 = min(Cmax ; max(Cmin ; τ Ct ))
τt+1 = max(τmin ; min(τmax ; τt + random(−0.01, 0.01))
C0 , the start value of C, is chosen uniformly in the interval [Cmin , Cmax ]. We set Cmax to 0.20 $
per KWH and Cmin to 0.10 $ per KWH. We set τ0 to 1.0 which is the start value of the τ . The
trend τ is reset to 1.0 when the random walk exceeds the minimum or maximum boundaries.
In other words, if τd Ct < Cmin or τd Ct > Cmax then τd+1 = 1.0 which reduces the bimodal
tendency of the random walk [12].
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To regulate the upper limit of the retail market, we set the maximum tariff price of the market
to 0.5 $ per KWH. We set the default start price of the tariff to 0.28 $ per KWH. Figure 6.4 shows
an instance of the isolated retail market where one broker plays the Always Increase strategy
(AlI), and another broker plays the best response to it. The red zone represents the random walk
wholesale cost area, which is limited by a maximum and minimum cost value.
Customer Properties

Figure 6.5: Customer Demand Profile
We set the rationality of the customers to 1.0, and the inertia to 0. As a result, all the customers
in the market are always active and make 100% rational decisions. We set the customer population to 100. We have decided to simulate a small portion of the factored customer model from
the Power TAC retail market. In the factored customer model, all the population has the same
demand profile. We use a synthetic demand profile per day, which includes two peak demands.
These peaks are usually in the morning and evening times. The below graph shows a three-day
demand profile of the customer population. We use these 72 timeslots to simulate a retail market
trading environment. We have also introduced a random walk [12] error to the actual customer
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demand at a specific timeslot and use that as a demand prediction for the brokers so that they do
not possess the actual customer demands.

6.5.2

Baseline Methodologies Implementation

We use three baseline methods in our experiments.
Minimax Regret
In the minimax regret method, we do not learn a new strategy. Besides, we select the candidate
strategy, which has the lowest maximum regret if it is played against all the strategies in the candidate set. By minimizing the worst-case regret, the minimax regret method selects the candidate
strategy, which performs as closely as to the optimal strategy in the restricted candidate strategy
set [56].
Selfplay
In the self-play method, the agent learns a strategy by playing against the previous best version
of itself in the game without any domain knowledge except the game rules [59, 58]. The method
starts from random play, which is the first iteration, and the number of iteration goes on until it
converges. We use the same learning method as in our best response algorithm here. One iteration
means one training and testing round, where the Y-axis shows the average performance of the test
round. Figure 6.6 shows that our agent reaches the convergence area with few first iterations of
the self-play and then sees some variance for the rest of the iteration, which proves that the
agent cannot improve more. We stop the learning at 625 iterations and use that version in our
experiments. Additional details of the network architecture, training, and testing hyperparameters
used are presented in Table A.2 in Appendix A.
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Figure 6.6: Self Play Learning
Double Oracle EGTA (DO-EGTA)
In DO-EGTA method, at each iteration, we solve the game with the current strategy set, compute
the nash equilibriums for the current set, pick one equilibrium strategy, and learn the best response
strategy using DQN. If the learned strategy has a positive deviation in payoffs comparing to the
equilibrium strategy, we add it to the current strategy set, which creates the next strategy set.
We iterate this until we reach a convergence point, which is when there is only one equilibrium,
and the new equilibrium is a DQN strategy, or DQN fails to get a positive deviation to all the
equilibrium strategies of the current set. The below flow chart nicely describes the DO-EGTA
technique. We have a set of initial heuristic strategies, S H = (S1 , S2 , ....Sn ) for both players.
In each round t = (0,1,.....) of the iterative procedure, the current strategy set is St . A mixedNash equilibrium over these strategy sets under the game utility fuction U () is σt . The game
utility function U () is based on running simulations of the 3SDMG game in the isolated retail
simulator which helps us to estimate the utility values of the strategies played by the players. g()
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Figure 6.7: DO-EGTA flowchart
is a deep RL algorithm learns a better response against a opponent mixed strategy and returns
a pure strategy σt . v() a Nash-equilibrium solver, which returns any mixed Nash-equilibrium,
given a utility function and finite strategy sets. As this is a symmetric game, we provide only
one parameter for strategies in v() where both players use the same strategy set. Here is the
DO-EGTA algorithm for each iteration:
DO-EGTA Algorithm
Require: U, S H , g(), v()
t ← 0, St ← S H
σt ← v(U, St )
do
t←t+1
δt ← g(U, σt−1 )
if U (δt , σt−1 ) > U (σt−1 , σt−1 ) then
St ← St−1 + {δt }
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σt ← v(U, St )
while St 6= St−1
return σt , St
Table A.3 shows how we learn the ultimate DQN strategy from the 16 candidate strategies using
DO-EGTA.

6.5.3

CDO-EGTA Implementation

We propose the “Clustered Double Oracle EGTA” (CDO-EGTA) algorithm, where we cluster
the strategy set into groups using a clustering algorithm and learn a BR strategy for each of the
groups using the DO-EGTA method. We find a set of BR strategies instead of one strategy so that
we have a larger pool of strategies available that can be used to exploit specific types of opponent
strategies when we play the game.

Figure 6.8: Clustering phase in CDO-EGTA
In the clustered double oracle empirical game-theoretic analysis (CDO-EGTA) method, we
apply these subsequent steps:
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1. Generate a set of features (F eaturesH ) for each candidate strategy (C ∈ S H ) by playing
them against a group of feature extraction strategies (F ∈ S F ).
2. Using a clustering algorithm, c(), cluster all the candidate strategies S H into K groups.
3. Apply DO-EGTA algorithm, d(), on K groups
4. Learn N best response strategies and create a mapping of best responses (Mbr ) for K
groups.
CDO-EGTA Algorithm
Require: U (), d(), S H , S F , c(), G()
for C ← S H do
for F ← S F do
ScoreF = U (C, F )
f ← {F, ScoreF }
F eaturesH ← {C, f }
{Clusters, K} ← c(F eaturesH )
k←0
do
k
Mbr
← d(Clusters[k])

k ←k+1
while k < K
return Mbr , Cluster
CDO-EGTA has two main components. The first component is the clustering part, where
it uses some feature extracting strategies to generate payoffs for the candidate strategies. We
call these payoffs as extracted feature data, which we use to group them using some clustering
algorithm.
The second component we need to implement when applying the DO-EGTA procedure is
a specific method for finding BR strategies. In this work, we use Deep Q-Networks to learn
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BR strategies, so we begin by explaining the setup of the states, neural network, and finally, the
algorithm itself.
State Features
In the previous chapter, we had only two features in our state the cash balance and market share.
With a higher number of features, we can make more accurate predictions by better distinguishing
the states. Nevertheless, tabular Q-learning becomes infeasible when the number of features
grows. In Deep RL, we do not face this issue because we approximate the Q-values using a
function approximator, i.e., a neural network. This allows us to add a more significant number of
more useful state features so that we can recognize the states with better accuracy. We have used
37 historical data points as our state features. We have two time-related data (i.e., day, hour), six
tariff prices, two profit values, three unit-cost prices, six taken actions, three market share points,
and three customer demand profiles. We use hot-encoding for the action, so in total, we have 37
features for our states. The details of the state features are presented in table A.1 Appendix A.
DQN Setup
We used the deep Q-network (DQN) deep reinforcement learning model familiarized by Mnih
et al. [45], and we specifically implemented the Double DQN variant form introduced by van
Hasselt et al. [72] We use the Deeplearning4j framework libraries to implement the DQN in our
experimentations. [63]
We use a three-layer (25 X 13 X 7) neural network (NN) for our DQN, where each of the
hidden layers is fully connected with the next hidden layer. We treat each state’s 49 features as
inputs that go into the first hidden layer of 25 nodes. The last layer has seven nodes, which we
connect to the output layer of 3 nodes as we have three actions.
Additional details of the network architecture and training hyperparameters used are presented in Table A.2 in Appendix A.
In our experiments, we use two feature extraction strategies (ZI, and the strategy itself) in
S F . By playing each strategy from S F 1000 times, we get two feature values for each strategy.
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Figure 6.9: Neural Net Architecture for DQN
We have 16 candidate heuristic strategies in S H . After extracting the feature values for each of
the 16 candidate strategies, we apply a clustering algorithm on the extracted feature values to
find groups and learn the corresponding DQN best responses for each group using DO-EGTA.
Figure 6.8 shows four groups when we apply the k-means clustering algorithm with k = 4. Later,
DO-EGTA learns an ultimate strategy for each of the groups and creates a map of BR strategies.

6.6

Results

Due to the possibility of non-transitive relationships among several agents [2], [62], it can be
challenging to evaluate the quality of learned strategies in games. It might not be possible to
fully capture the advantages and disadvantages of a strategy using a single scalar score point.
Our goal is to examine how effectively we can exploit the opponent’s strategies. Regret analysis
helps us to measure how close we were making the optimal choice or exploiting other strategies
while deciding under uncertainty. As regret analysis measures the opportunity loss, we use it as
a metric to evaluate the strategies found by the CDO-EGTA and baseline methods.
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6.6.1

Regret Comparison of the Methodologies

In CDO-EGTA, we plan to cluster the candidate strategies based on the extracted feature data.
Initially, we use the mean shift [7] clustering algorithm as we do not know the right number
of clusters. The mean shift algorithm finds the number of clusters from the extracted feature
data and does the grouping accordingly. In our experiment, this method clusters the candidate
strategies into four groups that are listed below.
Table 6.4: Groups created by mean shift clustering algorithm with 2 features
Strategy Set

Strategies

1

ZI, ZIP, GD, 1TF2T, 1TF1T, 2TF1T, SoftMJ, Grim, AlS

2

Pavlov, NvPbr, AlD

3

AlI, NvI

4

HardMJ, Pbr

We learn four final BR strategies by applying DO-EGTA on these four groups and create a
map of BR strategies for these groups, which is the output of our CDO-EGTA method.
In our experiments, we create an empirical game where player 1 (row player) has all the
strategies as his actions, including four new strategies found by the four methods plus all the
16 candidate heuristic strategies denoted by C1 C16. Player 2 (column player) has only the
restricted set of candidate strategies, i.e., 16 in this case as his actions. Thus we create a 20x16
payoff matrix, where we run 1000 test games for each cell to generate the payoffs for both players.
After generating the payoffs, we calculate the regret-table for player 1. Figure 6.10 shows the
regret table for player 1 where we accumulate all the regrets row-wise for each of the actions of
player 1. Figure 6.11 shows the accumulated regret values for all the four methods where our
CDO-EGTA method achieves the lowest regret than others.
The result shows that the clustering algorithm is successful in grouping the candidate strategies according to the extracted features, and the DO-EGTA method becomes more effective in
learning new strategies when we use it in CDO-EGTA. While playing the retail game, the CDO-

79

Figure 6.10: Regret table for player 1
EGTA method finds the corresponding best response strategy against the opponent agent from
the BR mapping and plays accordingly to exploit the opponent. The other methods use only
one ultimate DQN strategy, which is not able to exploit all the groups and end up having higher
regrets.

Figure 6.11: Average Regret Comparison
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6.6.2

Experiment with different cluster sizes

We also want to see how the performance of the CDO-EGTA changes by the cluster size. For
this, we use the k-means clustering algorithm, where we put different values of K and analyze
the performance.
Regret Comparision by Cluster Size
We learn different BR maps for different number of clusters and do an empirical analysis of 1000
test games. Figure 6.12 shows that the regret value decreases with the increasing number of

Figure 6.12: Regret Comparision By ClusterSize
clusters. It makes sense because the best way to play this game is to learn best responses to every
individual retail strategy and play the best response against those strategies in the game. So when
we are increasing the number of clusters, we are diving into the optimal route. However, learning
BR policies for all the retail strategies is infeasible for large strategy space. So we need to find
a reasonable point where we can do the trade-off of not learning against all single strategies and
not treat them all in a single group.

81

Elbow Method: Finding optimal cluster size
For the k-mean clustering algorithm, we can use the elbow method to find the proper number of
clusters to the group the candidate strategies. WCSS is the summation of each cluster’s distance
between that specific clusters each point against the cluster centroid and figure 6.13 shows that
the within-cluster sum of errors (WCSS) decreases as we increase the number of clusters.

Figure 6.13: Finding the proper number of clusters in K-means algorithm
To find the optimal number of clusters, we try to find a point in figure 6.13 where the cluster
size and WCSS value are minima.
Figure 6.12 shows the importance of clustering on the candidate strategies while learning new
strategies in this domain. We understand that the optimal way to exploit the opponents in this
game is to learn a separate BR strategy for each of the strategies. However, it is infeasible due
to high dimensional strategy space. By increasing the number of clusters, we are following that
optimal path because the highest number of clusters we can achieve when we have one strategy
per cluster. Thus CDO-EGTA method guides us on how to learn better strategies than existing
methods.
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6.7

Disscussion

The main question we ask in this chapter is how we can design an algorithm to find better regret
minimizing strategies by exploiting the opponent strategies. Our proposed CDO-EGTA method
achieves this objective by using the standard DO-EGTA method to get a near-optimal performance in regret analysis. One of our limitations is that we have a restricted set of actions for the
brokers, along with a restricted set of initial heuristic strategies. Also, our trading environment
is a duopoly market where real-world markets are an oligopoly. We also simplified our customer
model, where real-world customer models can be very complex and rich. With all these new
challenges in this domain, one can do many interesting experiments on this work, which can lead
to many exciting future research directions.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Motivated by the contributions of autonomous trading agents in the future energy grid, this dissertation offers autonomous trading algorithms for agents in competitive dynamic energy markets.
This chapter reviews the dissertation’s main contributions and discusses the promising future
work in the challenging domain of autonomous trading.

7.1

Main Contributions

In this work, I present a general bidding algorithm for periodic double auction markets that offers
state-of-the-art performance in minimizing cost in different market scenarios. I also offer a novel
method for finding effective retail strategies in a high dimensional strategy space for autonomous
brokers. We show that our proposed method can help a broker to minimize its regret by exploiting
opponent strategies while playing against a set of candidate strategies.
In chapter 3, we show methods of predicting prices in dynamic PDA markets and show that
our agent can effectively bid using supervised price predictors. We have learned several price
predictors to forecast prices in PDAs but found that REPTree (a type of decision tree) algorithm
performed best in empirical evaluations for different agent scenarios. We also learn that by estimating the market-clearing prices for null auctions increases the performance of the predictors
significantly. [9, 8]
Chapter 3 sets the background for chapter 4, where we propose a novel PDA bidding strategy, which is the current state-of-the-art strategy in the PDA domain. Here we contribute to the
development of an isolated test-bed where we decouple other markets from the wholesale market to design and experiment with PDA bidding strategies [10]. We have designed an effective
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wholesale bidding strategy using the Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithm to minimize cost in
PDA markets [10]. We have also worked on the enhancement of the MCTS bidding strategy
using heuristics and empirical analysis [11]. Our MCTS wholesale bidding strategy has a stateof-the-art performance which can minimize costs better than any other existing strategies in the
literature. [9, 8, 10, 11].
Chapter 5 focuses on learning the retail strategies in the vibrant, dynamic retail market of
PowerTAC, where we see that the policy learned against specific opponents do best, and the
policy learned against random agents is robust. However, we are unable to gain the highest
profit against rival agents because our states have a low number of features that are not sufficient
enough to capture the whole experience in learning using tabular q-learning efficiently. Another
issue is our tariff structure, which is too simple (flat-rate tariff) compared to other agents who are
publishing complex tariffs (tiered or TOU tariffs) and exploiting the market.
The insights from chapter 5 motivate us to formalize the retail trading problem as a game
(3SDMG) using game-theoretic concepts where we develop a simple isolated retail simulator to
play this game. We have simplified the retail market by reducing its complexity from the Power
TAC retail market as the Power TAC simulator is very slow to produce training data. We have
extracted the core retail market logic from the Power TAC to create a simplified model, where we
decoupled PowerTAC retail market from the other markets (wholesale and balancing markets)
so that we can better understand the retail trading dynamics. One of our objectives is to extract
the strategic behaviors from the retail strategies by using the abstracted simulator to efficiently
design new promising retail strategies faster with the help of empirical game-theoretic analysis.
We apply deep reinforcement learning (DQN) to learn the best response strategy for a specific
strategy played in this simulator. Here we can recognize the essential features and use gametheoretic solution concepts to design a profit-maximizing retail strategy. Using DQN as a best
response learning technique, we propose “Clustered Double Oracle Empirical Game-Theoretic
Analysis” (CDO-EGTA), a novel method for minimizing regret (i.e., maximizing revenues) in
retail trading. CDO-EGTA method clusters the existing pool of strategies into groups, learns a
new BR strategy for each of the groups using the DO-EGTA method, and outputs a class of BR
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strategies to play the retail game. Empirical results show that our method outperforms the existing
methods in regret analysis and successfully exploits the opponent strategies while playing them
in the retail game.

7.2

Future Work

Improving the accuracy of the price predictor will increase the performance of our bidding strategy, so working on the improvement of the price predictor is an excellent future research direction. We use supervised price predictors to predict prices in our bidding strategy and make a
minimal effort to explore this area. We can ask questions related to the robustness of the supervised PDA price predictors and work on ways to minimize the error effectively online. We can
ask if it is possible to use the supervised price predictor as a baseline and learn the errors of it
online as offsets, and then add the offset to baseline predicted prices to get more accurate prices.
Another exciting direction can be working on improving the MCTS bidding strategy. In
our MCTS bidding strategy, we use a single price predictor where PDAs can have a 24 hour
ahead window. We can try using 24 different price predictors for each of the hour-ahead markets
and analyze the bidding strategy’s performance. One can also try using memory-based MCTS
[84] instead of the standard MCTS in our bidding strategy and analyze the results for better
performance.
In the retail market, our work is restricted to a set of candidate retail strategies and in a
duopoly trading environment. We also assumed that we could identify the opponent agent while
trading in the retail market. However, real-world scenarios can be an oligopoly market where the
candidate strategy space can contain unknown retail strategies, and brokers keep their identity
private. These facts can lead to many promising future research directions; for example, we can
ask questions about how our proposed method will perform against unknown retail strategies.
One idea is to find the proper group for the unknown strategy by using CDO-EGTA’s clustering
algorithm and then use the corresponding BR strategy to play the game against that unknown
strategy. For better performance, by including the unknown strategy in the candidate strategy
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set, we can update the candidate groups by doing a new clustering, and learn corresponding BR
policies for all the new groups accordingly. We have used DQN as our BR learning technique.
We can use other deep reinforcement learning techniques such as actor-critic, A3C, and analyze
the performance for positive deviations in payoffs better than DQN. One can apply HADO-EGTA
[80] instead of DO-EGTA in our CDO-EGTA method for better performance.
We learned abstract retail strategies in the retail simulator, which is needed to map back
to a more sophisticated retail strategy if we want to test it in the Power TAC simulator. The
future work on this part can be how to map back the isolated retail strategy to a real, complex
retail strategy. A more comprehensive study is needed to harness the strength of these learning
approaches better.
The evaluations in the wholesale and tariff markets are conducted independently of each other.
Thus, another future direction includes developing the complete trading strategy by coupling the
isolated wholesale and retail strategies and evaluating the complete broker in the Power TAC
simulation against other successful brokers. One can also participate in Power TAC’s annual
tournament and empirically evaluate their brokers against other successful Power TAC brokers
from different research groups around the world each year.

7.3

Concluding Remarks

It will be a significant advance if intelligent bidding agents can replace humans in the future
dynamic energy markets. Our work shows that we can successfully use machine learning and
artificial intelligence to predict market prices and make intelligent trading decisions in dynamic
wholesale auctions and retail trading markets. I believe that AI will play a significant role in
building the coordination mechanism of smart grid markets, and my dissertation will contribute
to future experiments on this domain and help others to understand better the difficult challenges
faced by future energy delivery systems.
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Table A.1: State features of the DQ Agent
Features

Node Number

Current Timeslot

(1)

Hour of the day

(2)

Previous TS Profit

(3)

Profit Per Timeslot

(4)

Previous TS tariff price

(5)

Previous pub cycle’s tariff price

(6)

2nd previous pub cycle’s tariff price

(7)

Opponent’s previous TS tariff price

(8)

Opponent’s previous pub cycle’s tariff price

(9)

Opponent’s 2nd previous 2 pub cycle’s tariff price

(10

Previous timeslot unit cost

(11)

Previous pub cycle’s unit cost

(12)

2nd previous pub cycle’s unit cost

(13)

Previous timeslot’s action

(14–16)

Previous pub cycle’s action

(17–19)

2nd previous pub cycle’s action

(20–22)

Opponent’s previous timeslot’s action

(23–25)

Opponent’s previous pub cycle’s action

(26–28)

Opponent’s 2nd previous pub cycle’s action

(29–31)

Previous TS market share

(32)

Previous pub cycle market share

(33)

2nd previous pub cycle market share

(34)

Customer’s previous TS demand

(35)

Customer’s current TS demand

(36)

Customer’s next TS demand

(37)
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Table A.2: Hyperparameters of DQ Agent Training and Testing
Param

Values

discountfactor

0.99

experience-reply

1000

batch-size

100

target-dqn-update-freq

500

reward-factor

0.01

min-epsilon

0.1

epsilon-nb-steps-perc

1.0

Test Rounds

1000 games

Training Rounds

5000 games

100

Table A.3: Learning Strategies using DO-EGTA
Candidate Pool (Tot. #NEs)

Selected NE (Learned Strat.)

AlD, NvPbr, Pbr (3)

1.00 AlD (D0)

AlD, NvPbr, Pbr, D0 (1)

1.00 D0

Add AlI to pool
AlI, D0 (3)

1.00 D0 (D1)

AlI, D0, D1 (5)

1.00 D1 (D2)

AlI D0,D1,D2 (3)

1.00 D2 (D3)

AlI, D2, D3 (1)

1.00 D3

Add ZI to pool
ZI, D3 (3)

1.00 D3 (D4)

ZI, D3, D4 (1)

1.00 D4

Add HardMJ to pool
HardMJ, D3, D4 (1)

1.00 D4

Add AlS to pool
AlS, D4 (3)

1.00 DQ4 (D5)

AlS, D4, D5 (3)

0.54AlS+0.46D5 (D6)

AlS, D5, D6 (3)

AlS is not contributing

Add Pavlov to pool
Pavlov, D5, D6 (3)

Pavlov is not contributing

Add Grim (G) to pool
G,D5,D6 (7)

0.32G+0.2D5+0.48D6(D7)

G,D5,D6,D7 (3)

0.77G+0.23D7 (D8)

G,D7,D8 (3)

0.63G+0.37D8 (D9)

G,D9,D7 (5)

1.00D7 (D10)

G,D9,D7,D10 (3)

1.00D10 (D11)

G,D9,D7,D10,D11 (5)
G,D9,D7,D11 (5)
G,D9,D7,D11,D13 (7)

1.00D11 (D12)
0.78G+0.04D9+0.18D7(D13)
0.95G+0.05D13 (D14)

G,D9,D7,D11,D13,D14(5)

0.79G+0.18D7+0.03D13(D15)

G,D9,D7,D11,D13,D15(9)

0.83G+0.09D7+0.08D15(D16)

G,D9,D7,D11,D16,D15 (1)

1.00 D11

Add SoftMJ to pool
SoftMJ,D11 (3)

0.69SoftMJ+0.31D11 (D17)

SoftMJ,D11,D17 (1)

1.00 D11

Add 2TF1T to pool
2TF1T,D11 (1)

1.00 D11

Add 1TF1T to pool
1TF1T,D11 (3)

0.621TF1T+0.38D11 (D18)

1TF1T,D11,D18 (1)

1.00 D11

Add GD to pool
GD,D11 (3)

0.59GD+0.41D11 (D19)

GD,D11,D19 (3)

0.94GD+0.06D19(D20)

GD,D11,D19,D20 (1)

1.00 D11

Add 1TF2T to pool
1TF2T, D11 (1)

1.00 D11

Add ZIP to pool
ZIP, D11 (3)
ZIP, D11, D21 (3)

0.77ZIP+0.23D11 (D21)
ZIP is not contributing
0.13D11+0.87D21 (D22)

D22, D11, D21 (1)

1.00 D11
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